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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2010, the United States joined the rest
of the developed world in extending access to basic health
care to all its citizens. Yet, while the American government
has affirmatively answered one fundamental question—
should health care be universal?—it has done so by creating
a myriad of new entities and obligations that are
fundamental to the success and survival of the health
reform itself. Each and every one of these new entities will
need to be defined; their responsibilities will have to be
articulated and their roles explained. Not since “the man
gave names to all the livestock, the birds of the air and all
the beasts of the field”1 has there been such a massive
creative challenge.
To implement the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”),2 the Department of Health and
Human Services and other agencies must now generate
volumes of regulations to define what qualifies as a
“qualified health plan”;3 to explain what care constitutes
“essential health benefits”;4 and to populate a new
“Physician Compare Internet” website with physician
1. Genesis 2:20 (New International Version).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18021(a) (West Supp. 2010).
4. Id. § 18022.
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performance and patient experience information that does
not violate new patient privacy protections.5 Providers and
regulators will determine how to construct an “Accountable
Care Organization”6 and where to build “patientcentered
medical homes.”7 State legislators must create new
insurance “exchanges,”8 establish “highrisk pools,”9 and
develop infrastructure to accommodate vastly expanded
rolls of “newly eligible”10 Medicaid patients while meeting
new “benchmarks”11 or “benchmark equivalents” for
evaluating the adequacy of coverage.12 The legislative and
regulatory task ahead is huge. However, not only is the
work of health reform implementation dauntingly enormous
like the biblical nomenclature assignment, but just as in the
ancient account, giving names to all the new creatures is
the easy part of the task. The harder work will be saving
them from the flood of ACA litigation which has already
begun.
Twentysix states have filed suit to challenge the
constitutionality of the ACA. They have asked a Florida
court to conclude that the ACA’s individual mandate (which
is neither a mandate nor does it apply to all individuals) is
unconstitutional.13 Four states have enacted nullification
laws intended to block federal reforms, and voters in three
more states will face antireform measures during the
upcoming midelection cycle.14 Courts will soon be called
upon to construe the volumes of regulatory and legislative
language that ACA implementation will generate. Yet, the
5. Id. §§ 1395w5(a),(c).
6. Id. § 1395jjj(a)(1).
7. Id. § 256a1(c)(2).
8. Id. § 18041(a)(1).
9. Id. § 18001(c).
10. Id. § 1396d(y).
11. Id. §§ 1396a(k)(1), 1396u7(b)(1).
12. Id. §§ 1396a(k)(1), 1396u7(b)(2).
13. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 3.10
cv91RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (granting summary
judgment to plaintiffs on grounds that the individual mandate exceeds
Congressional commerce clause powers).
14. One such measure has already passed in Missouri. See Monica Davey, In
Missouri, Health Law is Rejected by Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A11.
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ACA has no preamble and contains no title dedicated to
rules of construction or general findings and purposes. Thus
courts, lawmakers, and all others seeking to implement the
ACA will be navigating uncharted waters.
This Article argues that the legal and ethical
foundations of fiduciary law—primarily of agency theory—
provide an organizational model for describing this nation’s
emerging health care system and supply the legal
framework for analyzing the inevitable challenges to the
ACA’s implementation. Existing contract and tort law rules
governing health care entities will not suffice. For example,
the laws that previously prohibited the corporate practice of
medicine or required clinical integration to approve provider
networks will have to be rethought. This Article argues
that a refined look at the fiduciary law already governing
some aspects of medical relationships provides an over
arching legal paradigm for analyzing, approving, or
correcting steps taken to implement the ACA. The
contribution this Article makes is to present a body of legal
principles that I call the “fiduciary medicine model.” This
model is the legal paradigm that can best guide legislators,
regulators, courts, and the health care industry in
implementing and achieving the goals of the ACA. The
importance of this contribution is that without such a
model, the implementation of America’s health reform could
fall far short of Congress’s ambitious goal—to universalize
access to health care, while simultaneously reshaping both
the private and public markets that finance health care and
the organizational entities that deliver and control the
quality of health care in America.
Part I begins with the bold and undoubtedly
controversial claim that all health care actors, including the
state itself, create, finance, and distribute health care in the
context of their fiduciary relationships with patients. This
proposition provides contextual understanding for the legal
roles new and existing entities will play as health care
reform is implemented. It is supported by an analysis of the
wellestablished common law and ethical foundations of the
fiduciary relationship between a physician and a patient.
The main idea of this section is to build a firm doctrinal
foundation from which to extend established fiduciary
obligations, already applied elsewhere in the health care
field, to all major participants in the health care industry.
This idea is not without precedent. Indeed, the
American law of fiduciary relationships was first espoused
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to protect patients in relationships with physician providers
in 1760,15 and in 1819 Chief Justice John Marshall affirmed
that the agency relationship between the government and
the nation is one of “common sense.”16 Since then, fiduciary
law has defined the duties and obligations owed by
individual and institutional health care providers to
patients in a wide variety of cases.17 This is a sizeable body
of common law, as all American jurisdictions except one18
have recognized that the providerpatient relationship is
one of trust and confidence, obligating the physician to
remain loyal and to act in accord with fiduciary standards.
However, these standards are only generally defined and
the fiduciary duties owed by individual physicians are
haphazardly applied to institutional health care providers
and payers. Moreover, jurists, policy makers, and legal
scholars have thus far ignored the compelling fiduciary
obligations owed by the most pervasive actor in American
health care: the United States government. This section
concludes with a review of the legal literature to
demonstrate widespread dissatisfaction with existing
fiduciary doctrines. Health law scholars have observed for
twentyfive years that the way in which courts and
lawmakers currently apply fiduciary rules to health care is
obtuse and limited. The time is ripe for a new
understanding of fiduciary law in the health care context.
Part II presents the new fiduciary medicine model and
serves as the core of this Article. This section constructs the
model based on four principles that sharpen and expand the
fiduciary rules that should apply to all existing and
emerging health care relationships. I begin by disabusing
the reader of two erroneous, though longstanding, notions
that seem to have confounded jurists in medical law: first,
that onesize fiduciary law fits all fiduciary relationships;
and second, that medical relationships are fiduciary because
they are trusts. Neither premise is true. In fact, most health
15. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *122.
16. See John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE
(July 15, 1819), reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND 207, 211 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969).
17. See infra Section II.A.
18. Alabama is the only state to have held that physicianpatient
relationships are not fiduciary. Gunter v. Huddle, 724 So. 2d 544, 546 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1998).
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care interactions are fiduciary in nature because they are
agency relationships. This is the first principle of the
fiduciary medicine model. While trust law is largely
inappropriate to describe (much less regulate) most of these
relationships, agency law provides a comprehensive and
organized body of law that courts, legislators, and policy
makers may access to bring order and predictability to
health care relationships throughout the reformed
American health care delivery system. However, a narrowly
defined group of health care relationships that involve the
disposition of property are accurately described as trusts.
The second principle of the fiduciary medicine model
identifies which health transactions and relationships are
agencies and which are trusts, in order to accurately
determine which body of fiduciary law applies to each. The
model’s third principle addresses the possibility that
fiduciary law can align conflicting patient interests with the
complex network of those who act on their behalf to
purchase, deliver, and reimburse the cost of health care
goods and services. Finally, the fourth principle of the
fiduciary medicine model acknowledges that the state owes
the fiduciary duties of good faith, loyalty, and care when
acting as a payer and regulator in the health care
marketplace.
This section demonstrates the pervasiveness of agency
relationships that exist throughout the American health
care delivery system and how they will grow when key
ACAcreated entities are implemented. Also, because the
network of agency relationships in health care is well
described in health economics literature, I use these
principles of agency theory to describe how the fiduciary
medicine model might reach beyond physicians and
individual patients to require skill, competency, loyalty, and
good faith from hospitals, home health agencies,
pharmaceutical companies, nursing homes, employers, and
a host of other agents.
This analysis of fiduciary principles is important and
timely. First, because the most recent, precedentsetting
Supreme Court decision on health care providers’ fiduciary
obligations19 wrongly refers to the fiduciary rules belonging
19. In Pegram v. Herdrich, the Supreme Court cited the seminal treatise on
trust law to explain its decision not to allow the defendant HMO to be held
liable for medical error as a fiduciary. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 22425,

2011]

AMERICAN HEALTH CARE REFORM

721

to trust law in its holding, the potential for replicating this
mistake in lower courts is great, especially as further ACA
enabling rules are enacted. Second, the lack of clarity and
precision has artificially hindered courts from imposing the
full breadth of available fiduciary doctrine to guide and
protect health care actors. As a result, the system of legal
rules with perhaps the most potential to help courts address
conflicts in health care relationships and policy is vastly
underutilized.
We
can
no
longer
afford
this
misunderstanding now that the ACA has been passed.
Part III offers concrete steps that courts and legislators
may employ to implement the fiduciary medicine model.
Courts can take advantage of the model’s benefits by
referencing a concrete body of fiduciary law and applying it
to appropriate disputes as a standard for judicial review. To
demonstrate, this section applies these fiduciary rules to
two dilemmas in health law that predated the current
reform movement: the problem of limiting the influence that
financial incentives have on health care providers’ medical
judgments, and the question of how to restructure informed
consent law to encourage shared decision making. This
section concludes by offering a proposed enabling statute,
modeled after the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, which a
state legislature wishing to implement the fiduciary
medicine model might enact. I conclude by making
observations about the impact this Article’s model can have
on the longterm sustainability and success of the ACA ’s
new organizational structure and ideals for American
health care reform.
I. CURRENT FIDUCIARY HEALTH LAW
Fiduciary relationships describe a variety of
interactions between health care providers and patients, in
which patients rely upon those more knowledgeable,
skillful, and powerful than themselves to act in their best

231 (2000). My argument here is not that the outcome of Pegram would or
should have been different if this misunderstanding were corrected, but that the
decision has unfortunately constrained subsequent courts and commentators
from applying fiduciary law as the important and useful tool it is in addressing
health care policy dilemmas.
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interest.20 Fiduciary law requires an expert to exercise
prudent judgment and selfless discretion to protect the
weaker party who is dependent upon, but lacks sufficient
information or influence to effectively monitor, the expert’s
choices.21 In America, we apply the doctrine to protect the
values of trust accounts, bank accounts, and corporate
shares, as well as to compel fairness towards employees,
shareholders, depositors, patients and others who we regard
as vulnerable to the superior knowledge and control of
employers, directors, doctors, and guardians.22 Therefore, it
is not surprising that courts have developed a nearly
unanimous consensus on applying the fiduciary doctrine to
protect at least some interests of individual patients in their
relationships with physicians and other health care
providers.23 But the courts’ failure to plainly extend the
doctrine to cover more complex providerpatient and payer
relationships is surprising indeed.
Fiduciary principles appear only haphazardly in
opinions resolving a variety of medicallyrelated disputes.
Courts have yet to articulate a clear set of legal duties that
flow from fiduciary principles or specify the parties to whom
they apply. Before the 2010 health care reforms, invoking
the vague and unpredictable body of common law on
fiduciary health care relationships would have meant
perpetuating this disarray. It is unclear whether the
dramatically increased number of new entities envisioned
by the ACA could have survived this confusion. However,
the ACA also introduces a paradigm shift that compels a
fresh look at fiduciary law and how it applies to American
health care. President Barack Obama made reference to
20. See, e.g., 49 A.L.R. 3d 501 § 2(a) (1973) (“The relationship of physician
and patient is one of trust and confidence imposing on the physician a fiduciary
duty to reveal to the patient that which in his best interest he should know.”).
21. See Peter J. Jacobson & Michael T. Cahill, Applying Fiduciary
Responsibilities in the Managed Care Context, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 160
(2000); E. Haavi Morreim, HighDeductible Health Plans: New Twists in Old
Challenges From Tort and Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 123435 (2006).
22. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 105556
(1991).
23. See Mitchell v. Harris, 246 So. 2d 648, 65152 (Ala. 1971) (stating that
there is no fiduciary relationship between physician and patient as a matter of
law); Gunter, 724 So. 2d at 546.
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this paradigm shift when he spoke on March 23, 2010, when
he signed the ACA:
Tonight after nearly 100 years of talk and frustration, after
decades of trying, and a year of sustained effort and debate, the
United States Congress finally declared that America’s workers
and America’s families and America’s small businesses deserve
the security of knowing that here, in this country, neither illness
nor accident should endanger the dreams they’ve worked a
lifetime to achieve. . . . We didn’t give in to mistrust or to cynicism
or to fear. Instead, we proved that we are still a people capable of
doing big things and tackling our biggest challenges. We proved
that this government—a government of the people and by the
24
people—still works for the people.

The President spoke accurately when he stated that the
ACA does “big things” and tackles “our biggest challenges”
in health care policy. Moreover, the President’s executive
proclamation highlighted the importance the reform places
on the government’s role in fundamentally reorganizing the
public and private markets that deliver and pay for health
care in a competitive environment.25 Unquestionably,
Congress has rejected a public payer or central government
controlled health care system.26 Yet the participant chiefly
responsible for stabilizing the health care markets
envisioned by the Act is the government. The ACA increases
state and federal government responsibilities to manage
competitive health care markets to unprecedented levels.
Expanding the role of fiduciary law in health policy will, I
assert, determine the extent to which the government’s
reform will, in fact, “still work for the people.”
24. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Address to the American
People Following the Signing of the Affordable Care Act (Mar. 23, 2010)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/22/what
changelooks).
25. Health Insurance Exchanges, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES—CENTER
FOR
CONSUMER
INFORMATION,
http://cciio.cms.gov/
programs/exchanges/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (“The Affordable
Care Act helps create a competitive private health insurance market through
the creation of health insurance Exchanges. These staterun, transparent
marketplaces, which launch in 2014, will provide millions of Americans and
small businesses with “onestop shopping” for affordable coverage.”).
26. Robert Pear & Jackie Calmes, Senators Reject Pair of Public Option
Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/
30/health/policy/30health.html.
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The ACA will expand access to health care to cover
approximately thirtytwo million previously uninsured
Americans by 2019,27 with substantial financial help from
the federal government. Individuals who require but are
unable to pay for private insurance coverage will be
subsidized by meanstested federal tax credits to help cover
the cost of their premiums.28 Under Medicaid and the
Children’s Health Insurance Program, the federal
government will finance the largest extension of coverage to
newly eligible categories of lowincome Americans since the
program’s inception.29 The government will pay premium
assistance and increases in the Federal Medical Assistance
Percentage to cover 100% of the expansion’s cost from 2014
to 2016, and the percentage will decrease to 90% of the cost
by 2020.30
The ACA also appropriates funding to finance states’
demonstration programs designed to test alternatives to the
tort liability system31 and introduces payment bundling cost
controls.32 Throughout the ACA, Congress has approved
federal grants to finance more than thirtyfive pilots,
demonstration projects, and studies aimed at testing
reforms to delivery and payment systems that the Secretary
27. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget
Office, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives
(March 20, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/
AmendReconProp.pdf [hereinafter Congressional Budget Office Letter]. But see
RAND RESEARCH BRIEF, ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT 3 (H.R. 3590) (2010), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_briefs/RB9514.html (finding that number to be 28 million).
28. 26 U.S.C.A. §36B (West Supp. 2011).
29. Under ACA Title II, Congress extended Medicaid coverage to childless
adults earning up to 133% of the federal poverty level, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West Supp. 2010); former foster children, Pub. L. No.
111148, § 2004, 124 Stat. 283 (2010); and to freestanding birth centers, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(28) (West Supp. 2010).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (West Supp. 2010); see also Alec MacGillis,
Study of HealthCare Law Rebuts State Protests on Medicaid Costs,
WASH. POST, May 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/
content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052603216.html (summarizing a Kaiser
Family Foundation study finding that state spending for increased
Medicaid coverage will be mitigated by federal expenditures).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 280g15.
32. Id. § 1395cc4(c)(3)(C)(i).
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of Health and Human Services may make law if she finds
them effective.33 In order to direct health care professionals
to underserved areas and populations, Congress has
authorized funding to enhance training programs and
forgive education loans to nursing students,34 specialists in
pediatrics35 and primary care,36 and public health
professionals.37. Additionally, the ACA appropriates new
funding to finance research and development of medical
innovations38 and collect data in connection with Patient
Centered Outcomes Research39 to enhance antifraud
enforcement.40
Indeed, the comprehensiveness of these interdependent
provisions represents one of the ACA’s primary strengths.
The ACA’s ten titles simultaneously address improvements
in the quality of health care delivery, greatly increase access
to health care, and modify payment systems to contain
health care costs. Health reform analysts have long
recognized and agreed that only a coordinated attack on
cost containment, quality improvement, and expanding
access will work to meaningfully reform and universalize
American health care.41 This act does that. Yet, such a
coordinated and comprehensive reform is costly.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cost
of implementing the final ACA, including the Manager’s
Amendment and Reconciliation Bill, is likely to require
33. For a summary of all pilot and demonstration projects under the ACA
prepared by the Capital Health Group, see Pilot Programs and Demonstration
Projects, available at http://www.caphg.com/media/CHG%20Summary_%
20Pilot%20Programs%20and%20Demonstration%20Projects.pdf.
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 297b(a) (West Supp. 2010).
35. Id. § 295f(a).
36. Id. § 292s(a)(1).
37. Id. § 295f1(a).
38. Id. § 1315a(a)(1).
39. Id. § 1320e(b).
40. Id. §1395(i).
41. See, e.g., John V. Jacobi, The Present and Future of GovernmentFunded
Reinsurance, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 369, 377 (2007) (favoring a universal coverage
system as opposed to an incrementalist approach); Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and
Policy Making Under Health Care Reform, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 404 (1995);
David Pratt, The Past, Present and Future of Health Care Reform: Can It
Happen?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 767, 796 (2007).
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$788 billion in new government spending, which will be
offset by savings and spending reductions, thus resulting in
an increase in overall spending of $114 billion over the nine
year period from 2010 to 2019.42 The magnitude of the
government’s spending and regulatory role under the
newlyreformed health care regime is unprecedented, and
must be viewed through an entirely new legal lens. In other
words, the fiduciary role of the state itself, acting through
legislators and regulators, can no longer be ignored.
Fiduciary law can clearly give effect to the government’s
obligations under the ACA that Congress contemplated in
organizing the new health care landscape. This Article
explores the entire range of fiduciary relationships that
characterize the new health care landscape and the legal
rules that should apply to them. I include the relationship
between the state and its citizens in this analysis, but begin
with the most fundamental fiduciary relationship in the
health care delivery system—the relationship between
doctor and patient.
A. The PhysicianPatient Fiduciary Relationship
Some courts have a longestablished history of
acknowledging the fiduciary nature of the physicianpatient
relationship in medical malpractice cases,43 holding that the
provider’s fiduciary duty arises from the trust and
confidence patients place in physicians to operate in good
faith, remain loyal to their patients, and subordinate their
own selfinterest and the interests of others. Based on the
recognition that the physicianpatient interaction is a
relationship of confidence and trust,44 these courts readily
apply fiduciary principles to enforce duties involving
42. Congressional Budget Office Letter, supra note 27.
43. See, e.g., Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990, 999 (Ariz. 2002) (“We long ago held
that a patient and a doctor were in a fiduciary relationship ‘calling for frank and
truthful information from’ doctor to patient.”) (quoting Acton v. Morrison, 155
P.2d 782, 784 (Ariz. 1945)). See also Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d
479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (asserting a physician’s fiduciary duty to disclose personal
financial interest in a procedure and citing California case law in support dating
back to 1947); Stafford v. Schultz, 270 P.2d 1, 78 (Cal. 1954). But cf. Gunter v.
Huddle, 724 So. 2d. 544, 546 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (uniquely holding that the
physicianpatient relationship is not fiduciary).
44. See, e.g., Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio
1991).
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disclosure and informed consent,45 patient confidences, and
not withholding or fraudulently concealing46 information
patients or related third parties are entitled to receive.47 The
fiduciary duty obligates physicians to refrain from ex parte
communication with lawyers in adversarial proceedings48
and provides the basis upon which physicianpatient
communications are privileged.49 A court may rely on the

45. Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493 (Ariz. 1978) (“[B]ecause of the fiduciary
relationship between physician and patient, the scope of the disclosure required
can be expanded by the patient’s instructions to the physician.”); Demers v.
Gerety, 515 P.2d 645, 648, 650 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973) (approving an instruction
on the fiduciary relationship in an action where the patient had not consented to
an operation that had been performed).
46. See Nardone v. Reynolds, 538 F.2d 1131, 1136 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding
that breach of fiduciary duty occurs when a doctor fails to disclose a known
condition, and that such duty does not expire when the consensualcontractual
relationship ends); Batty v. Ariz. State Dental Bd., 112 P.2d 870, 87677 (Ariz.
1941) (noting that in all such dealings, a physician’s relationship with a patient
is one of trust and confidence and that a provider must use the utmost good
faith or he is guilty of fraud).
47. See, e.g., Davis v. Rodman, 227 S.W. 612, 614 (Ark. 1921) (“The relation of
a physician to his patient and the immediate family is one of the highest
trust.”). But see Lemon v. Stewart, 682 A.2d 1177, 1183 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1996) (recognizing that the relationship between a health care provider and a
patient is based on trust and confidence, giving a patient the right to assume his
HIVpositive status will not be voluntarily disclosed to relatives without
consent); Morris v. Consol. Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 648, 657 (W. Va. 1994) (holding
that a patient has a cause of action against a physician disclosing information to
an employer for breach of the duty of confidentiality and against an employer
who induced the physician to breach his fiduciary relationship by disclosing
confidential information).
48. See e.g., Petrillo v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 962 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986) (finding that public policy favoring physicianpatient confidentiality and
the fiduciary nature of the physicianpatient relationship justifies prohibition
against ex parte communication); Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2008 UT 8, 177 P.3d
614, 61920 (2008) (holding that the health care fiduciary duty of confidentiality
prohibits ex parte communications between a tort plaintiff’s treating physician
and defense counsel in the underlying tort action).
49. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dean v. Cunningham, 182 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Mo.
2006) (holding that the fiduciary duty of confidentiality between patients and
doctors is part of the foundation of the doctorpatient evidentiary privilege). But
cf. Stigliano v. Connaught Lab., Inc., 658 A.2d 715, 721 (N.J. 1995) (bringing a
medical malpractice suit waived the physicianpatient privilege concerning the
patient’s treatment because it put the plaintiff’s medical condition in issue).
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fiduciary relationship to preclude a treating physician from
providing expert testimony against a patient.50
Moreover, courts also have extended fiduciary law to
protect the vulnerable status of patients where physicians
may exercise discretionary power over them. Physicians
may not exercise undue influence over their patients. For
example, courts are suspicious of financial transactions
between providers and patients outside the treatment
context.51 Regularly, courts place the burden upon providers
to show the fairness of transactions entered into with and
conveyances received from their patients.52 And many
courts, though not all, will find fiduciary obligations
breached where a physician takes sexual advantage of a
patient.53 Finally, courts impose the fiduciary duty on
providers to act in their patients’ best interest,54 to act in
50. Piller v. Kovarsky, 476 A.2d 1279, 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984)
(“[T]he fiduciary nature of the [physicianpatient] relationship should preclude a
physician from testifying against his patient as a liability expert, at least in a
medical malpractice action involving the very condition for which the physician
has treated the patient.”).
51. See Houghton v. West, 305 S.W.2d 407, 41112 (Mo. 1957) (the defendant
physician had a fiduciary relationship which carried into the parties’ dealings
beyond the medical treatment rendered); see also Mattingly v. Sisler, 175 P.2d
796 (Okla. 1957):
It is contended that the relation of physician and patient constitutes a
confidential relationship and it is further contended that where the
evidence shows the existence of such relationship and the party in
whom confidence is reposed obtains an apparent advantage over the
other in a transaction between them such transaction is presumed to be
void and the burden of proof is upon the party who seeks to support it
to show by clear proof that he has taken no advantage over the other
party and that the transaction is fair, free from fraud and is
conscientious. This is a correct statement of the law.
Id. at 799.
52. See, e.g., Unruh v. Lukens, 31 A. 110, 113 (Pa. 1895).
53. Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242 (Nev. 1986) (stating that a
physician who takes advantage of a vulnerable patient would “fall below the
acceptable standard for a fiduciary”). But cf. Korper v. Weinstein, 783 N.E.2d
877, 88182 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (finding that a physician did not breach the
fiduciary duty owed to the patient by engaging in a consensual sexual
relationship with her, because a fiduciary relationship does not encompass all
interaction between parties measured by fiduciary standards).
54. Ison v. McFall, 400 S.W.2d 243, 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (providing that
any physician, chiropractor, or M.D. who has a fiduciary relationship with his
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good faith, and to deal fairly with their patients, while
eschewing kickbacks,55 excessive services,56 and improper
referrals.57
In addition to physicians, institutional providers also
have been found to owe a fiduciary duty to their patients. A
nursing home may breach its fiduciary duty to an elderly
resident by failing to provide suitable care.58 The fiduciary
duty obligates nursing homes and pharmaceutical
companies to collect only reasonable fees.59 A public hospital
and its physicians owe a fiduciary duty to use their best
judgment and employ their skills to provide the same
attention and care that would be due from a private health
care facility and its doctors.60 Thus fiduciary law already
serves as a regulator of multiple aspects of the relationship
patient and who knows or should know that a treatment will not benefit his
patient must advise his patient of that fact).
55. See Forziati v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 128 N.E.2d 789, 79192 (Mass.
1955).
56. See, e.g., Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 218, 223 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997)
(affirming the trial court’s finding of breach of fiduciary duty in a case where a
doctor’s protocol included “unnecessary computerized muscle testing” performed
by “incompetent personnel,” on grounds that there was not full and fair
disclosure).
57. See, e.g., Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Wingo, 697 So. 2d 1231, 1232
33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
58. In Petre v. Living CentersEast, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. La. 1996), the
court stated that “fiduciary relationships are most often found in financial
dealings,” and that it could “think of no relationship which better fits the . . .
description [of fiduciary duty] than that which exists between a nursing home
and its residents.” Id. at 812.
59. See Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 330, 35051 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(upholding a breach of fiduciary duty action against a nursing home and a
related pharmaceutical company to recover excessive fees where a resident had
confidence in the nursing home and the nursing home was found to be in a
position of “superiority and influence”); Greenfield v. Manor Care, Inc., 705 So.
2d 926, 93132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding a fiduciary duty between a
nursing home and its residents that was rooted in a special relationship
independent of any contract).
60. Jackson v. Okla. Mem’l Hosp., 909 P.2d 767, 773 (Okla. 1995) (“A licensed
attending faculty physician—who, as a member of a state medical school faculty,
is charged with delivery of medical care to patients—performs much the same
function as an attending physician at a private healthcare facility.”). But cf.
Nutty v. Jewish Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1050, 105253 (S.D. Ill. 1983) (explaining
the difficulty of deeming a patient’s relationship with a hospital a fiduciary one).
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between health care providers and individual patients.
Current applications of fiduciary law are pervasive in the
medical context and are firmly based on the well
established
ethical
responsibilities
that
providers
historically owed to their patients.
1. Ethical Roots. The law of fiduciary relationships rises
directly from the ancient, oftrepeated, selfproclaimed
ethical duties physicians owe to patients in treatment
relationships. Physicians in Ancient Greece organized
themselves into a professional guild, in which members
shared professional principles most famously articulated
sometime during the fourth century B.C. by the Greek
medical philosopher Hippocrates.61 Hippocrates wrote the
oath which required new physicians to swear upon Apollo
and a number of healing gods to uphold the ethical
principles of their profession: “I will follow that system of
regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I
consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from
whatever is deleterious and mischievous.” 62 One translation
continues: “I will keep them from harm and injustice.”63
Today’s modern version of the oath, still ceremonially
recited by medical school students across the nation,
declares: “I will treat without exception all who seek my
ministrations, so long as the treatment of others is not
compromised thereby.”64
Many legal scholars have traced how these historic
pronouncements of physicians’ ethical commitments to
beneficence and justice have evolved into today’s modern
declarations by the American Medical Association.65 The
61. See HIPPOCRATES, THE OATH OF HIPPOCRATES, reprinted in THE HARVARD
CLASSICS VOLUME 38: SCIENTIFIC PAPERS (PHYSIOLOGY, MEDICINE, SURGERY,
GEOLOGY) 11 (2006).
62. Id.
63. Translation from the Greek, in LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC
OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND INTERPRETATION 3 (1943).
64. The Hippocratic Oath, NAT’L KIDNEY AND TRANSPLANT DIV.
(March 1, 2009), http://members.tripod.com/nktiuro/hippocra.htm.

OF

UROLOGY

65. See, e.g., Charity Scott, Doctors As Advocates, Lawyers as Healers, 29
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 331, 33537 (2008). Referencing the “long and
honorable history” of physicians as fiduciaries flowing from medical ethicists
such as doctors Laurence B. McCullough, John Gregory, and Thomas Pervical,
Professor Scott explains how the physician’s ethical obligations to be competent
and loyal, to act for the benefit of their patients, to refrain from selfinterested
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purpose here is not to rehearse that history. My limited
objective is to review the way in which these ethical
messages and commitments have been incorporated into
current medical fiduciary law.
Legal efforts to enforce a physician’s pledge to benefit
and not harm patients were first introduced in the 1760s by
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England. There,
the legal action for medical malpractice—the failure to
avoid what is deleterious or to act for the benefit of the
sick—was described as “[i]njuries . . . by the neglect or
unskilful [sic] management of [a person’s] physician,
surgeon, or apothecary . . . [condemned] because it breaks
the trust with the party had placed in his physician and
tends to the patient’s destruction.”66 Around the same time,
in New York State, medical societies were given the right to
hold physicians and surgeons accountable to professional
standards under a 1760 law which was upheld as
constitutional in 1833:
[W]ith a view to the moral character, as well as the learning and
skill of the members of this most useful and responsible
profession, it gives to the county medical societies the right to try
any of their members against whom specific charges of gross
ignorance or misconduct in his profession, or of immoral conduct
67
or habits, may be brought.

In that state’s first reported negligence action against a
physician, the Supreme Court of New York County reversed
a trial court’s evidentiary ruling in favor of the defendant
physician in an action alleging “maltreatment of a leg,
broken below the knee.”68 Thus, from the eighteenth
century, American jurisprudence analogized the nature of
the physicianpatient relationship to that of an employer
and a laborer.69 The relationship was one in which the
behavior, and to keep patient confidences while disclosing relevant information
parallel a physician’s legal duties as a fiduciary. Id.
66. Emily Chow, Note, Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of Medical
Malpractice with Potentially Fatal Complications, 7 YALE J. OF HEALTH POL’Y, L.
& ETHICS 387, 404 (2007) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*122)).
67. In re Smith, 10 Wend. 449, 456 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).
68. Edwards v. Stewart, 15 Barb. 67, 68 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1853).
69. See id. at 6869.
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patient entrusted her health to the physician, depending
upon the latter’s exercise of skill and expertise, to benefit
the patient in a way that caused neither harm nor injustice.
The legal fiduciary standards that governed this
relationship emanated from ethical obligations that
encompassed the professional, intellectual, and moral
performance of providers.
2. Distinguishing Negligence. It is important to
distinguish the fiduciary obligation recognized in law from
the duty imposed on providers to act nonnegligently.
According to one commentator, negligence law “only
adumbrates fiduciary law.”70 Malpractice occurs when a
professionallydefined standard of care is breached, while
fiduciary violations may also offend standards of trust
defined outside of the profession.71 Procedurally, fiduciary
law places a reduced burden of proof upon plaintiffs making
out a prima facie case.72 Plaintiffs can access equitable
remedies by merely showing that a fiduciary obligation
existed and was breached.73 Many jurisdictions allow a
fiduciary cause of action with or without proof of actual
injury.74 Courts enforcing fiduciary rights have the power to
When a party undertakes a work of skill and labor and performs it so
unskillfully that his employer derives no benefit from the work, he is
not entitled to recover any thing [sic], for his labor. This is an
elementary principle; and if the employer not only derived no benefit
from the services, but sustained a positive injury, entitling him to
compensation for damages, the case is still stronger against the laborer
or professional man.
Id.
70. See Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided
Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM.
J.L. & MED. 241, 249 (1995).
71. See, e.g., Caroline Forell and Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust,
42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 557, 565 (2009) (“Trust and loyalty are what
distinguish fiduciary from nonfiduciary relationships.”); see also Brian M.
Serafin, Comparative Fault and Contributory Negligence as Defenses in Attorney
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Cases, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 993, 995 (2008) (“The
factor which most distinguishes negligence from breach of fiduciary duty is what
constitutes duty.”).
72. See Serafin, supra note 71, at 99495.
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d(1) (2006).
74. For a discussion of the differences between negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty causes of action, see generally Serafin, supra note 72.
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award restitutionary damages and punitive damages and to
enjoin future misconduct.75 It is unclear why courts chose
negligence over the fiduciary standard in malpractice
actions,76 especially in light of the mounting evidence that
physicians themselves are unable to reach consensus about
the most effective way to provide beneficial treatment,77 and
in light of the failure of customary standards of care to
account for the complexity of financial incentives on
physicians’ and other providers’ judgment.78
The fiduciary duty operates apart from and in addition
to the duty under tort law to meet the customary standard
of care.79 Beyond the duty to provide nonnegligent care,
fiduciary law requires a physician to do more than meet the
standard of care or produce a certain outcome—say finding
a cure for the complainedof disease. Fiduciary law focuses
on the extent, quality, and integrity of the expert’s effort,
dedication, and decision making on behalf of a patient.80 In
Pegram v. Herdrich,81 the United States Supreme Court
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d(1) (2006).
76. See Jonathan J. Frankel, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost
Containment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J.
1297, 131516 (1994); Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for
the Medical Profession: The “Accepted Practice” Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213,
123436 (1975); Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12
VAND. L. REV. 549, 55859 (1959).
77. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL.
L. REV. 389, 462 (2009) (“The malpractice system’s greatest failing, from a
quality and value perspective, is its reliance on clinical practitioners to specify
standards of care.”).
78. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits:
Restructuring the Legal Standard of Care, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 35 (1997).
79. See, e.g., Lownsbury v. VanBuren, 762 N.E.2d 354, 35758 (Ohio 2002)
(emphasizing that the physicianpatient relationship is a fiduciary one based on
the patient’s trust and confidence (meaning that the patient will rely on the
judgment and expertise of the physician), and based on the fact that the patient
obtained the physician’s services because of special knowledge and skill held by
the physician); Hunter v. Brown, 484 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Wash. 1971) (“‘We agree
with appellant that a physician’s duty to disclose is not governed by the
standard practice of the physicians’ community, but it is a duty imposed by law
which governs his conduct in the same manner as others in a similar fiduciary
relationship’”) (quoting Berkey v. Anderson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 78 (1969)).
80. See generally Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Fiduciary Obligation in
Clinical Research, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 424 (2006).
81. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
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distinguished fiduciary duty from negligence actions and
precluded plaintiffs from recasting ordinary medical
malpractice actions as actions for breach of a fiduciary
duty.82 Yet, at the same time, the Pegram decision may be
read to preserve and even extend the breadth of fiduciary
obligations that compel providers to act in their patients’
best interests in other contexts.83
The power of fiduciary law lies in the fact that it is an
equitable doctrine, rooted in the tradition of the English
chancery courts before whom citizens came to seek royal
justice and “let right be done.”84 However, despite the
ancient roots of the fiduciary obligations that American
courts now recognize in the physicianpatient relationship,
legal commentators have found the current doctrine
wanting.
B. Critiquing the Current Law
For at least twentyfive years, legal scholars have
sought to expand the influence of fiduciary law to regulate
health care relationships. Until now, the direction and
reasons for that expansion have only been discussed in a
piecemeal fashion, to address a discrete doctrinal deficiency
in the individual physicianpatient relationship. A
systematic review of the legal scholarship on fiduciary law
82. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1137, 1156 (“The [Supreme] Court seems to close the door on all actions against
physicians for breach of fiduciary duty, not just claims brought under ERISA, on
the basis that they are nothing more than medical malpractice claims.”).
83. In criticism of the Circuit Court of Appeals decision to limit fiduciary
actions to those involving a financial conflict of interest, the Supreme Court
reasoned:
[T]his attempt to confine mixed decision claims to their most egregious
examples entails erroneous corruption of fiduciary obligation and would
simply lead to further difficulties we think fatal. When a mixed
[treatment and eligibility] decision made solely to benefit the HMO or
its physician would violate a fiduciary duty, the fiduciary standard
condemns far more than that, in its requirement of “an eye single”
toward beneficiaries’ interests.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 235 (emphasis added).
84. Paul F. Figley & Jay Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign
Immunity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1213 (2009) (quoting Ludwik Ehrlich,
Proceedings Against the Crown (12161377), in OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND
LEGAL HISTORY 97 (Paul Vinogradoff ed., Octagon Books 1974) (1921)).
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and its application to health care reveals an unexpected
consensus. Legal scholars have collectively identified two
significant defects in the current applications of the
doctrine. First, the current fiduciary law focuses too
narrowly on selected obligations that flow between provider
and patient, ignoring the larger systemic duties that are
squarely within the influence and discretion of medical
providers and vitally important to expanding access to
health care. Second, the application of fiduciary law to
medicine has not been updated to reflect the complexity of
modern health care delivery systems that now exist in the
United States, thus limiting the reach of the law’s influence
and excluding other actors in the network of relationships
that comprise health care delivery today. This second
omission will be compounded as health care reform
implementation adds new health care entities to the health
care market.
In 1983, Francis Miller laid the groundwork for an
understanding of the reach of fiduciary law in medicine. She
was concerned with the fiduciary responsibility that
physicians bear when they receive secondary income from
ownership and investment interests in facilities that
provide their patients’ treatment.85 Miller identified not only
the predictable fiduciary obligations—to avoid selfdealing,
to exercise of undue influence, and to act in a patient’s best
interest—but also foreshadowed a fourth category that
could flow from the fiduciary duty of loyalty arising because
physicians are actors in what he called “the medical
industrial complex.”86
Though virtually untested in courts, Miller saw then
that the rising cost of delivering medical care must mean
that the physician’s fiduciary responsibility includes the
duty to protect patients’ financial resources by abstaining
from unnecessary care and by providing the least expensive
(but still effective) treatment.87 Further, she suggested
physicians might hold a systemic fiduciary obligation to
85. Frances H. Miller, Secondary Income from Recommended Treatment:
Should Fiduciary Principles Constrain Physician Behavior?, in NEW HEALTH
CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 155
(Bradford H. Gray ed., 1983).
86. See id. at 153, 166.
87. Id. at 159.
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minimize crosssubsidization.88 However, Miller also saw
that the trust analogy between physician and patient was
insufficient to support the breadth of the fiduciary doctrine
she proposed.89 If physicians were held as trustees of patient
finances as well as trustees of their health, then any
medical advice or treatment they gave would be self
dealing.90 Yet Miller’s identification of the need for a
systemic view of the fiduciary doctrine that addressed
health care costcontainment was prescient.
In 2002, Professor Marc Rodwin further explained that
the changed health care environment has left the
physician’s status as a fiduciary “ambiguous,” and the
current fiduciary metaphor as “only helpful up to a point.”91
Rodwin examined the fiduciary relationship between
guardians and wards, lawyers and clients, and corporate
officers or directors and shareholders, and identified
similarities they share with the patientphysician
relationship.92 His chief complaint with the fiduciary
metaphor for the physicianpatient relationship was its
inability to constrain financial conflicts of interest in
medicine despite its ability to do so for other fiduciaries.93
Rodwin argued that neither licensing boards, hospitals,
professional organizations, regulators, nor courts hold
physicians accountable to a full range of fiduciary
obligations, and so concluded that systemic realities strain
88. See id. (referring to the “Robin Hood method of prices” which the author
thought ended with the advent of Medicare and Medicaid).
89. See id. at 15455.
90. See id. at 157.
91. Rodwin, supra note 70, at 242. But cf. infra Section II.A.1 (discussing
Rodwin’s error in analyzing physicians as trustees).
92. See Rodwin, supra note 70, at 24245. Rodwin stated that these groups
are “entrusted with power and property to be used for the benefit of another,”
are “held to the highest standard of conduct,” are repositories for specialized
knowledge and expertise, are given latitude to exercise discretion, and are
expected to work on behalf of those who are dependent and reliant on them. Id.
at 24344. They must be “scrupulously honest,” may not divulge confidences,
and cannot promote their own selfinterest or the interest of a third party over
the best interest of their beneficiary (or “fiducie,” as Rodwin suggests). Id. They
owe loyalty and are subject to judicial scrutiny holding them to “something
stricter than the morals of the market place.” Id. at 244 (quoting Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (Cardozo, J.)).
93. See id. at 249.
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fiduciary principles.94 Rodwin accurately pointed to the lack
of a “simple criteria [to] fully explain how courts decide
which relationships they will recognize as fiduciary,”95 but
he incorrectly blamed limitations on fiduciary law itself for
failing to adequately supervise physicians.96 Professor
Rodwin’s unmatched contribution to a right understanding
of the fiduciary medicine model, however, is that he
identified a “gap” between the fiduciary doctrine and the
economic and structural reality of the health care industry.97
The solution Marc Rodwin proposed was much smaller
than the problem he outlined. Rodwin’s remedy was to
incorporate competing interests into the fiduciary loyalties
that physicians might owe.98 Nevertheless, Rodwin, like
Miller, must be credited with seeing that the existing use of
fiduciary law to regulate health care relationships is, as yet,
too limited for medicine as it is practiced in this new era. In
his words, the metaphor was “strain[ed]” by physicians’
loyalties that extend beyond a single patient beneficiary.99
Moreover, we owe Rodwin a debt of thanks for the insight
that imposing fiduciary law is a decision of social policy and
choice.100 Rodwin gave not only the impetus to expand the
fiduciary model to encompass a broader, more complex
range of medical relationships, but he pointed to the public,
population, and aggregational pressures that would inform
later scholars. Rodwin explained, “[i]t seems unlikely that
society will quickly abandon the fiduciary metaphor for
physicians for a simple reason. Public policy and market
forces are creating pressures for greater physician and
provider accountability. And accountability is the core of the
fiduciary ideal.”101
94. See id. at 24951.
95. Id. at 245.
96. See infra Section II.A.1 for an explanation on how the mistake of choosing
trust rather than agency law to define medical fiduciary obligations, as Rodwin
has done here, has resulted in a fiduciary doctrine that is illfitting and
therefore prompts jurist to resist applying fiduciary law to health care.
97. See Rodwin, supra note 70, at 247.
98. Id. at 25556.
99. Id. at 255.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 255 (footnote omitted).
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While M. Gregg Bloche and Mark Hall put forth
differing perspectives on the role of fiduciary law in
medicine, both scholars found the doctrine could do more.
Professor Hall’s comprehensive discussion offered a
phenomenological perspective on the entire body of health
law—one that flowed from the understanding that
“therapeutic goals should be primary considerations in a
body of law that arises from and governs a common
enterprise whose central objective is individual health and
wellbeing.”102 Hall views law as having three possible
stances toward trust: predicated, supportive, or skeptical.103
Fiduciary law syllogistically concerns itself with
maintaining
institutions’
intrinsic
and
presumed
trustworthiness, thus falling into the law’s predicated
stance where law can either arise “axiomatically from the
existence of trust” or provide the rules that vindicate
existing trust and punish its violation.104
The example Hall uses to fix fiduciary law within this
schema is informed consent.105 But he soon finds that the
fiduciary doctrine runs out of steam. Hall says, after
highlighting two consent cases as examples of syllogistic
reasoning used to proclaim the fiduciary characteristics of
the physicianpatient relationship, “[s]yllogistic reasoning
extends only so far.”106 He states:

102. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 468 (2002).
Professor Hall proffers trust as an organizing principle for health law based
upon the empirical evidence that patients trust physicians, patients want to
trust physicians, relationships between physicians and patients where trust is
absent are dysfunctional, and the deep emotional content of trust in its essence
has an instrumentalist therapeutic effect on patients, helping them to heal. See
id. at 47879. Hall says that this therapeutic paradigm also encompasses
institutional relationships between hospitals and insurers, for example, and the
component relationship between government and the profession. See id. at 467.
But I argue that the shortcoming in this analysis lies in considering all these
relationships with reference only to the patient’s individual experience in the
delivery of care. See infra Section II.B.2 for a discussion of the application of the
fiduciary model to patient populations.
103. See Hall, supra note 102, at 470.
104. Id. at 487.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 490.
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To give further shape and content to informed consent law, we
must turn to one of the two consequentialist stances [supportive
and skeptical] toward trust discussed below.
The predicated stance is highly indeterminate, despite its
syllogistic mode, because fiduciary law does not consist of an
integrated body of concrete rules or precise doctrine that applies
uniformly to all forms of fiduciary relationships. . . . Fiduciary
rules developed in one setting do not necessarily apply in all other
settings that have fiduciary characteristics. Instead, general
principles of fiduciary obligation give rise to various sets of rules
in many different settings in which the rules share only broad,
107
familial resemblance.

Of course, the object of Hall’s trust article was not to
elucidate fiduciary law. But the point of note here is that
Hall found fiduciary law offered only general principles that
were broad and loosely related, but understood this law was
flexible enough to apply differently across different medical
settings. Yet, in the end, it seems, Professor Hall could rely
upon current conceptualizations of fiduciary law in medicine
to do very little work in his trust paradigm.
Professor Bloche, in contrast, relies on fiduciary law to
do heavy lifting of a much grander scope. He applies the
doctrine to constrain physician selfishness, inspire collective
action, and even undergird the normative “rightness” of the
fiduciary duties themselves for medical actors to
internalize.108 The conversation between Hall and Bloche
swirls around the competing views regarding the interplay
between trust and law. Hall’s application of the trust
perspective proceeds from the ethical view that “[t]he
language of rights and the language of trust move in
opposite directions from one another.”109 Bloche, on the other
hand, sees the law as a response to the trust problem
created by the inability of the infirm to monitor their
providers despite the fact that “[d]iscretion, poorly
scrutinized, invites opportunism.”110 Thus in Bloche’s view,
107. Id. at 49091.
108. See M. Gregg Bloche, Comment, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical
Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REV. 919, 927, 93031 (2002).
109. Hall, supra note 102, at 469 (quoting Richard Sherlock, Reasonable Men
and Sick Human Beings, 80 AM. J. MED. 2, 3 (1986)).
110. Bloche, supra note 108, at 930 (citing Cooter & Freedman, supra note 22,
at 104647).
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the work of fiduciary law is expansive.111 Bloche concludes
that the “legal persistence, let alone strengthening, of
physicians’ fiduciary obligations to patients” may serve as
the chief obstacle to the contractarian agenda in medicine of
which he disapproves.112 Bloche’s analysis then sees room
for an expanded role for fiduciary law in regulatory health
care relationships.
Perhaps the most ardent apologetic on behalf of
applying fiduciary law to medicine has been Professor Max
Mehlman’s.113 For Mehlman, the power of fiduciary law
derives from its capacity to reach a category of physician
misdeeds to which patients are particularly vulnerable and
that only fiduciary law can reach.114 Furthermore, dishonest
mistakes—those instances where doctors cause patient
harm not because they are careless or hyperefficient, but
because they are in pursuit of their own interests at the
expense of the patient’s—are the most egregious of all.115 For
these offenses, only fiduciary law will do. Mehlman cites the
procedural and doctrinal advantages of fiduciary protections
for patients over contract law and tort—the burdenshifting
presumptions, access to punitive damages and injunctive
relief, and presumed asymmetries—to conclude that
“[w]hen it comes to protecting patients from physician self
aggrandizement, however, one of the most important legal
protections for patients is fiduciary law.”116 Mehlman turns
next to combating a fourfold attack on the availability of
111. This is illustrated by the fact that he begins his critique by citing the
ethical catastrophes of Enron and WorldCom, then condemns the notion of
allowing fiduciaries to contract out of their obligations. Id. at 921, 925. Bloche,
in his critique of Hall’s trust article, evinces the tension between individualist
and communal tendencies in the law. Speaking of the cost control objective,
Bloche admits by his own personal testimonial that “[a]s taxpayers, health
insurance purchasers, and priceconscious shoppers for goods and services, we
demand medical cost control—from government, our own health plans, and the
businesses we patronize. That we resist these controls when we and our loved
ones face lifethreatening or lifechanging illness is, for contractarians, the
central dilemma of health care policy.” Id. at 953.
112. Id. at 93233 (emphasis added).
113. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Dishonest Medical Mistakes, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1137
(2006).
114. See id. at 1147.
115. Id. at 1138, 114142.
116. Id. at 1147.
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fiduciary protections for patients. He sees the Supreme
Court’s decision in Pegram—contractarian scholars’
dismissive view that fiduciary law is merely an aspect of
contract, the emerging emphasis on trust rather than rights
to organize legal relationships in health, and the focus on
systemwide approaches to reducing medical error—as a
virtually warlike attack on the fiduciary foundations of
medical relationships.117 Mehlman calls for courts and law
makers to protect what he characterizes as “one of
[patients’] key refuges” against the “barrage of malpractice
reforms and the spoliation of managed care.”118 Mehlman
asks the Supreme Court to reaffirm patients’ fiduciary
rights contracted by Pegram; he proposes that lower state
and federal courts uphold patient fiduciary rights, and he
calls upon legislatures to cease weakening fiduciary
protections.119 Finally, Mehlman quite compellingly calls
upon scholars to advocate for imposing fiduciary obligations
on medical providers:
[T]here are important details of the scope of the physician’s
fiduciary duty to patients that remain to be worked out. But
uncertainty about the details of the fiduciary obligation is
certainly no reason to weaken, much less jettison, the physician’s
fiduciary obligations. In fact, if anything, fiduciary protections for
120
patients need to be increased.

Many other health law scholars have tried to expand
the application of fiduciary law. Some have attempted to
stretch the doctrine to add circumstances when fiduciary
duties are owed by the doctor to a patient. These scholars
have proposed expanding fiduciary disclosure obligations to
protect pregnant mothers121 or to apologize for medical
117. Id. at 1154.
118. Id. at 1137.
119. Id. at 1172.
120. Id. at 1172 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
121. Professor Michelle Oberman found the fiduciary construct limited and
indeed “hollow” as it applies to doctors treating pregnant patients. See Michelle
Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role
in MaternalFetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 457 (2000). Oberman
advocated expressly augmenting physicians’ fiduciary duties to disclose their
bifurcated loyalty to patients in utero so that pregnant patients could be warned
that their trust in physicians may be compromised. See id. at 46466.
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error.122 Others have sought to extend the law to create
affirmative duties for physicians in new contexts beyond the
treatment relationship123 or to impose negative obligations
when interacting with third parties.124 Our struggle in the
health law academy against the constraints of an already
broad and flexible doctrine cannot be read as a wholesale
outcry for the enlargement of the fiduciary doctrine in
health care.125 However, where there has been near
unanimity for a quarter of a century that the doctrine that
has described the primary health care delivery relationship
since the eighteenth century is falling short, we have to ask
why. I believe Miller and Rodwin pointed us toward the
answer years ago.
Both observed the pressure that radical changes in the
delivery of health care in the American “medical industrial
complex” have placed on the fiduciary medicine rules, as
they are currently understood.126 The pressure is
exacerbated by the advent of the new, larger, and more
interdependent actors in that medical complex that will
appear as the ACA is implemented.

122. Professor Scott sought to add to fiduciary duty the obligation to disclose
and apologize for medical error, and further suggested there might be a
fiduciary duty of continuing care owed to patients who seek futile treatments.
See Scott, supra note 65, at 368; see also Richard W. Bourne, Medical
Malpractice: Should Courts Force Doctors to Confess Their Own Negligence to
Their Patients?, 61 ARK. L. REV. 621, 623 (2009).
123. Professors Miller and Weijer argued to add clinical physicianresearchers
to the list of physicians who owe a fiduciary duty to protect patientsubjects. See
Paul B. Miller & Charles Weijer, Fiduciary Obligation in Clinical Research, 34
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 424, 42831 (2006).
124. Professors Hafemeister and Bryan posited that doctors have a negative
fiduciary duty to shun pharmaceutical gifts. See generally Thomas L.
Hafemeister & Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those Bearing Gifts: Physicians’
Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 491
(2009).
125. By “our struggle,” I mean that I count myself among those who have
argued for expanding fiduciary rules. I argued that racial, ethnic, and religious
disparities in informed consent law and practice could be addressed by a
broader concept of doctors’ fiduciary responsibilities. See Dayna Bowen
Matthew, Race, Religion, and Informed Consent–Lessons from Social Science, 36
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 150, 167 (2008).
126. Miller, supra note 85, at 15455; Rodwin, supra note 70, at 242.
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First, health care reform will shift influence over
physicians’ medical decisions towards groupbased decision
making, and away from considerations that focus solely on
an individual patient. The ACA rewards use of “quality
measures”127 and “clinical practice guidelines,”128 and
establishes new centers to research, disseminate, and train
practitioners to use innovative methodologies, technologies,
and best practices that have been proven effective over time
with diverse patient populations.129 Therefore, a fiduciary
doctrine that does not accommodate duties owed to a group
of patients and their representatives as principals does not
have application in this new economy.
Second, the authority to control costs, quality, and
access to health care has shifted away from individual
physicians and towards organizations. The ACA introduces
new delivery forms such as the Accountable Care
Organization (“ACO”), which is a group of providers and
suppliers formed to operate collaboratively to manage and
coordinate feeforservice care for Medicare beneficiaries.130
Thus, if the fiduciary law is to have continued relevance to
medicine, it must reach beyond physicians and other
organizations in the delivery network to include health
plans, insurers, employers and newly created participants
in the delivery network.
127. Quality measures are “a standard for measuring the performance and
improvement of population health or of health plans, providers of services, and
other clinicians in the delivery of health care services.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b31
(West Supp. 2010).
128. The ACA requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services to identify and disseminate the results of effectiveness research
showing the best practices identified across diverse patient groups. Id. § 18022;
see also id. § 1320e.
129. See e.g., id. § 1320(e) (creating the “Patient Centered Outcomes Research
Institute,” a nonprofit corporation); id. §§ 299b31 & 299b33 (creating the
“Center for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety,” an agency that will be
part of the existing Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality according to
ACA Title III, Section 3501 and ACA Title X, Section 10303); id. § 1315(a)
(creating the “Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation” which will operate
within the existing Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services).
130. Title III of the ACA creates the ACO program with the intent that it
“promote[] accountability for a patient population and coordinate[] items and
services under [Medicare] parts A and B, and encourage[] investment in
infrastructure and redesigned care processes for high quality and efficient
service delivery.” Id. § 1395jjj.
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Third, because the ACA reflects a sociopolitical shift
towards focusing on the health of populations rather than
only on the health of individual patients, fiduciary law must
speak to the public health concerns of populations, not just
individual patients.131
In order to serve these three radical changes in
America’s new health care landscape, the current fiduciary
rules must first correctly identify the stakeholders who
exercise fiduciary decisional discretion, then establish the
most appropriate body of fiduciary law to apply to each
stakeholder, and finally define an internally consistent
paradigm for applying these fiduciary rules to the majority
of health care relationships that will be appear under the
ACA’s implementation. Understandably, courts and
scholars have not been willing to extend an imprecise legal
regime to any but the most obvious cases where its
application has been historically accepted. As a result, I
assert that the single most powerful body of law that might
help to organize relational obligations between parties in
the medical industrial complex is vastly underutilized. This
omission will only be compounded as the ACA provisions
take effect.
To avoid this outcome, the next section develops a
robust version of the fiduciary doctrine that is suited to help
organize the health care industry. In it I introduce the core
theoretical contribution of this article—I call it the fiduciary
medicine model. The model is comprised of four principles
or elements that together bring the applications of fiduciary
law into sharper focus, and facilitate a broader
understanding of the role fiduciary law plays in addressing
health care policy conflicts that predated and will arise as a
result of the ACA.132

131. See, for example, id. § 300u10, which establishes the National
Prevention, Health Promotion and Public Health Council, increasing funding for
schoolbased health centers and appropriating funds for communitybased
prevention efforts, immunization and wellness programs, and a host of other
public health initiatives.
132. See Bloche, supra note 77, at 44546.
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II. THE FIDUCIARY MEDICINE MODEL
To say that a physician is a fiduciary “only begins
analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry.”133 This section
undertakes that further inquiry by thoroughly examining
the principles of fiduciary law that apply to physicians. I
begin by dismantling one of the greatest misunderstandings
about fiduciary law that currently applies to health care—
the notion that health providers are fiduciaries only to the
extent that they resemble financial trustees. This
misunderstanding has directed even the United States
Supreme Court to the wrong set of fiduciary rules when
applying fiduciary law to health care relationships.134 The
consequence of this error is grave. Seeing few clear
analogies between the law of trusts and health care
providers, lower courts and other analysts have settled for
applying only the broad values of fiduciary law—honesty,
trust, integrity, and loyalty to health relationships—but
have shunned the more concrete fiduciary rules that could
best help to order health care relationships and inform
health care policy.135
This section identifies agency, rather than trusts, as the
correct form of fiduciary relationship that characterizes the
basic physician and patient interaction. The power of this
understanding cannot be understated. Agency principles
delineate the full range of fiduciary relationships among
providers, payers, administrators, health plans, employers,
insurers, and patients in the health care market—not just
between providers and individual patients. Most
importantly, this analysis opens the door to a concrete body
133. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 8586 (1943).
134. In Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000), the Supreme Court cited
the seminal treatise on trust law to explain its decision not to allow the
defendant HMO to be held liable for medical error as a fiduciary. My argument
here is not that the outcome of Pegram would or should have been different if
this misunderstanding were corrected, but that the decision has unfortunately
constrained subsequent courts and commentators from applying fiduciary law
as the important and useful tool it is in addressing health care conflicts and
policy dilemmas.
135. See, e.g., Allison v. Blewett, 348 S.W.2d 182,184 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)
(noting that “[t]he relationship between doctor and patient is one of trust and
confidence” rather than explicitly applying fiduciary duties to the relationship);
Rodwin, supra note 70, at 242 (referring to the “fiduciary metaphor” rather than
concrete fiduciary rules).
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of fiduciary principles that may be usefully applied to
health care. This corrected understanding will guide courts
in applying the new health reform laws to existing and
emerging organizations, networks, and relationships in the
health care market.
A. Physician Fiduciaries
The physicianpatient relationship is characterized by
the trust and confidence that patients place in their
physicians. The resulting vulnerability the patient accepts
by placing herself at the mercy of the physicians’ exercise of
discretion and power contrasts sharply with the superiority
of medical knowledge and information the physician has.
Analogously, these characteristics liken the physician
patient interaction to a wide variety of fiduciary
relationships, each with distinctive implications: depositors
and borrowers trust banks and are subject to their
discretion; members of a general partnership are vulnerable
to one another’s exercise of discretion; corporate directors’
knowledge about the business they run is superior to
investors’; employees and beneficiaries both place
themselves at the mercy of employers’ and trustees’ exercise
of discretion. The list continues—executors, guardians,
parents, and union leaders have all been held to be
fiduciaries.136 And yet the structure of these fiduciary
relationships and the obligations that flow from them are
not all alike. Nor are they all analogous to the fiduciary
relationship between physician and patient. The task then
is to identify what type of fiduciaries physicians are with
respect to their patients. I start where the United States
Supreme Court did in Pegram v. Herdrich, by considering
whether the oldest form of fiduciaries—trusts—fits the
physician’s role.137
136. See Airline Pilots Assoc., Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 7475 (1991)
(unions); Eagan v. Jackson, 855 F. Supp. 765, 79980 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(guardians); Ginsburg ex rel. Palace Mgmt., 720 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (App. Div.
2001) (executors).
137. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 22324 (repeatedly citing principles, cases, and
treatises on the law of trusts to support a holding that defendant the Carle
Clinic HMO did not violate its fiduciary duty to an injured patient by not
immediately referring her to a specialist for an ultrasound to diagnose
abdominal pain, in response to financial incentives that rewarded limited
referrals).
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1. Physicians as Trustees. The law of trusts that defines
the rights and responsibilities between trustees and their
beneficiaries is the starting point for any discussion of
fiduciary law.138 However, the analysis of any fiduciary
arrangement must proceed further because not all fiduciary
relationships are trusts. Moreover, fiduciary law is not a
homogenous body of legal rules that apply to trusts as well
as to all other fiduciary relationships whether or not they
are trusts. Since trusts are a general form of fiduciaries, not
all duties imposed on trustees apply to nontrustee
fiduciaries. Therefore, before applying fiduciary law to
health care relationships, it is important to do what the
United States Supreme Court did not do in Pegram v.
Herdrich.139 The Pegram Court did not precisely identify the
types of fiduciary relationships that operate in the health
care industry and did not apply the body of fiduciary law
that fit the specific fiduciary relationship presented by the
facts of the case. Here, by carefully identifying the type of
fiduciary relationships that characterize health care, I will
correct the mistake that the Supreme Court and other
courts have made in their fiduciary analyses, and will
remove the conceptual roadblocks to an accurate application
of fiduciary law to regulate health care organizations.
In Scott and Ascher on Trusts, Professor Austin Scott
highlights the English origins of trust law.140 Scott quotes
Professor Maitland on the topic, who called the development
of the trust “the greatest and most distinctive achievement
performed by Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence.”141
Structurally, a trust is a relationship between parties with
respect to property. It is the method by which a person may
transfer legal title to property into the hands of a trustee,
while retaining equitable ownership of the same property.142
138. For a chronological summary of the evolution of fiduciary law from trusts
to agency to corporate contexts and beyond, see generally Tamar Frankel,
Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983).
139. 530 U.S. at 22324.
140. AUSTIN W. SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 1.1 at 3 (5th ed.
2006).
141. Id. (quoting MAITLAND, SELECTED ESSAYS 129 (1936)). But see Frankel,
supra note 138, at 795 n.1 (stating that the law of trusts originated in thirteenth
century French and German law).
142. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
(2010).

OF

TRUSTS § 2 (2003); pt. 3, ch. 8, intro. note
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The result is a relationship that subjects the trustee as
owner of title to the property to a welldeveloped list of
duties—to deal with the property solely for the benefit of
one or more beneficiaries or for charity, accompanied by a
clear remedial rule that applies in the instance of failure to
fulfill those duties.143 The list of fiduciary duties that
governs trustees provides an inviting body of law to apply to
physicians with respect to their patients. Consider the
appeal of holding physicians liable as trustees on behalf of
their patients as beneficiaries of a medical trust.
Trustees owe a duty of undivided loyalty to their
beneficiaries, not because of the contract between them, but
simply because of the relationship.144 Therefore, it is legally
immaterial that a trustee acted in good faith, entered into a
fair transaction, and reaped no personal benefit if the
trustee breached the duty of loyalty by, for example,
purchasing the trust property for himself. The trustee must
act solely in the best interest of the beneficiary, and never
for his own benefit, for the benefit of those with whom he is
closely related, or for the benefit of third parties where the
transaction creates a reasonably foreseeable conflict of
interest.145 Moreover, courts penalize selfinterested
behavior as a violation of the high standard of conduct
expressed in the duty of loyalty, except where the trustee
has made full disclosure and takes no unfair advantage.146
Courts have been said to do so with “[u]ncompromising
rigidity . . . when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty . . . . Only thus has the level of conduct for
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by
the crowd.”147
Trustees have a fiduciary duty to give full and accurate
information to beneficiaries upon request,148 and this duty is
a continuing one, obligating the trustee to keep beneficiaries
reasonably
informed
of
changes
and
significant
developments affecting the administration of the trust.149
143. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003).
144. SCOTT ET AL., supra note 140, § 17.2 at 107778.
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (2007).
146. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
147. Id. at 546.
148. SCOTT ET AL., supra note 140, §17.5 at 1196.
149. Id. at 119899.
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Trustees are obligated to exercise the care and skill of an
ordinary “prudent person.”150 This common law duty has
been codified as the “Prudent Investor Rule”151 and
incorporates the obligation to exercise reasonable care, skill,
and caution, but is distinguishable from the negligence
standard of reasonable care.152 Thus, where negligence will
hold an actor liable only for injury caused by failure to act
as others in like circumstances would act, the Prudent
Investor Rule holds a fiduciary liable for simply failing to
employ careful procedures, make use of his superior skills in
decisionmaking, or seek the advice of others who are more
skilled regardless of the eventual outcome.153 Trustees
furthermore have a duty to incur only reasonable costs,
preserve trust property, act prudently in the delegation of
authority, supervise trust strategy, and minimize the risk of
loss.154
Each of these would appear initially as attractive duties
to ascribe to the physician acting on behalf of the patient.
Applying a legally enforceable obligation to physicians to act
as a loyal trustee might settle Miller’s question of secondary
income, and would generally provide direction in addressing
the legal effect of financial incentives on physician medical
judgment. The trust paradigm would wipe away proof
problems faced by prosecutors who enforce the Stark Law’s
gnarly prohibitions against selfreferral, perhaps even
simplifying the myriad of exceptions under those rules.155
Similarly, antikickback provisions and the attendant safe
harbors would be greatly simplified, and plaintiffs would be
relieved of the burden to prove injury where they could
provide evidence of selfinterested relationships. The duty to
act in a patient’s best interest would more easily encompass
an obligation to implement proven, evidencebased
protocols. Legislatures seeking to craft laws restricting
physicians’ receipt of gifts from pharmaceutical companies
150. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 804 (2001).
151. UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 804 (2000).
152. See SCOTT ET AL., supra note 142, § 17.6 at 1209.
153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 77 at 82 (2007).
154. See generally SCOTT ET AL., supra note 140, § 19.
155. For a summary of Stark Law history and exceptions, see Andrew B.
Wachler & Adrienne Dresevic, Stark II Phase III—The Full Picture, 20 HEALTH
LAW., Sept. 2007, at 1, 3.

750

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

would have an established statute and accompanying body
of judicial interpretations to access rather than having to
reinvent the wheel. If a physician’s legally enforceable
obligation included the duty to incur only reasonable costs
on behalf of her patient, then the judicial review applying
trust law could become a useful tool in enforcing cost
containment goals. The trustee’s duty to act prudently in
delegating authority could be useful in addressing the
referral patterns to costly specialists. And the continuing
duty to supervise a trust strategy might give rise to a
physician’s analogous duty to practice comprehensive
preventative care rather than the episodic, acute level care
that costs the American health care system so dearly.
So why then has trust law not been used to resolve
these health law problems? The answer is because the
physicianpatient relationship is not ordinarily considered a
trust.156 Many duties commonly ascribed to trustees simply
make no sense in the physicianpatient context. The duties
concerning the trustee’s use or purchase of trust property,
keeping accounts, enforcing claims, defending actions
against the property, keeping trust property separate, and
making distributions from trust income and principle are all
central to the trustee’s obligations, but have no application
to a relationship between a provider and consumer of health
care services.
Though all trusts are fiduciary relationships, all
fiduciary relationships are not trusts; specifically, the
physicianpatient relationship is a fiduciary relationship
that is not a trust. Core to the concept of a trust is that the
trust is, above all, “most frequently a method of disposing of
property.”157 Patients dispose of no property when they place
themselves in a physician’s care. Physicians treating
156. While the relationship for medical treatment between a physician and
patient is not ordinarily a trust, a patient can enter into a transaction with a
physician to create a standard trust agreement. These transfers come under
close scrutiny by the courts. In Unruh v. Lukens, 31 A. 110 (Pa. 1895), for
example, a patient transferred property in trust to a physician who asserted the
transfer was valid consideration for medical services rendered. However, the
court cited the confidential relationship between the physician and patient and
set aside the elderly woman’s conveyance of real estate to doctor as trustee. Id.
at 11314. See also Macaulay v. Booth, 128 P.2d 386 (1942) (finding trust
ultimately not set aside because defendant doctor overcame the presumption of
undue influence).
157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §1 (2003).
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patients do not take ownership interest in any property
belonging to patients, whether the property is regarded as
tangible or relational.158 It is vital to put an end to any
speculation that the physician is a fiduciary because the
physician acts as a patient’s trustee; in doing so, it puts an
end to applying the law of trusts to the medical treatment
relationships that arise between a physician and her
patient. Simply put, trust law does not fit.159
Indeed, some courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, have mistakenly imported duties that
pertain to trusts in order to guide their decision making
about nontrust, medical fiduciary relationships.160 This
error causes confusion.161 For example, a Missouri court
concluded that fiduciary law prohibited a plaintiff’s treating
physician from becoming the defendant’s examining doctor
in a personal injury trial.162 This conclusion may be correct
on its face, but the underlying reasoning is faulty. The
Missouri court rested its view on the assertion that a
physician may not create a “dual allegiance” that violates

158. Id. § 40. Because no law limits the form or type of property interest that
may be held in trust, one might reason abstractly that a patient’s health and
body are a form of property but it would be very difficult to find any support for
this abstraction in the scholarly literature much less in reality.
159. “Although an agent has a fiduciary relationship with the principal, just as
a trustee has with the trust beneficiaries, the two relationships have a different
history, and different consequences flow from them.” SCOTT ET AL., supra note
140, §2.3.4.
160. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000) (referencing the
common law of trusts to define the scope of authority and responsibility of
fiduciaries, including the medical fiduciary in Pegram) (citing Cent. States, Se.
& Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985)); id.
(listing the stricter “morals of the market place” and general duties owed by
trustees to describe duties owed by medical fiduciaries) (quoting Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928)).
161. Following the Pegram decision, several lower courts have had difficulty
trying to follow the Supreme Court’s erroneous reliance on trust law in health
care cases. In Batas v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 281 A.D.2d 260 (2001), for
example, the court tried to make sense of the error by substituting the term
“duty of good faith” for the term “fiduciary duty,” in order to describe situations
where ERISA insurers and HMO’s have disclosure obligations to patients. Id. at
262.
162. State ex rel. McCloud v. Seier, 567 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1978).
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the duty of “undivided loyalty to his patient.”163 In today’s
health care market, this simply cannot be right. Physicians
reimbursed by thirdparty payers necessarily encounter a
dual allegiance to patients and insurers. The magnitude of
the legal error that results from misunderstanding this fact
is huge considering the overwhelming prevalence of third
party payers in the American health care market. In 2008,
for example, 88% of all Americans’ health expenditures
were paid by thirdparty sources.164 Simply put, any
fiduciary law model that does not allow for divided loyalty
by providers who care for patients, but are paid by their
third party insurers, has no application whatsoever to
modern health care delivery in America.
Beyond the confusion caused by the erroneous reliance
on trust law in health care cases, this mistake also prevents
a full, accurate application of the appropriate fiduciary rules
that apply to acknowledged fiduciary relationships in health
care. This problem is illustrated in Pegram v. Herdrich,
where the Supreme Court brought its fiduciary analysis of
the defendant HMO’s duties to a screeching halt after
wrongly citing the law of trusts:
Beyond the threshold statement of responsibility, however, the
analogy between ERISA fiduciary and common law trustee
becomes problematic. This is so because the trustee at common
law characteristically wears only his fiduciary hat when he takes
action to affect a beneficiary, whereas the trustee under ERISA
165
may wear different hats.

In addition to truncating its analysis and creating
confusing precedent, the most harmful fallout from the
Pegram Court’s incorrect reliance on trust law is the
impediment this mistake erects to clearly understanding
163. Id. at 128; see also Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96
(D.C. Ohio 1965) (explaining that confidences in the trust of a physician are
entitled to the same consideration as a res in the control of a trustee).
164. See The Nation’s Health Dollar, Calendar Year 2009: Where it Came
From, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, NAT’L HEALTH
EXPENDITURE
DATA,
https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/
downloads/PieChartSourcesExpenditures2009.pdf) (last visited Aug. 14, 2010).
See also Health, United States, 2009, NAT’L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 55
fig.21, 132 tbl.132, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus09.pdf (last visited Apr.
28, 2011) [hereinafter Health, United States, 2009].
165. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225.
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the full range of health care interactions beyond the
physicianpatient relationship that are accurately described
and controlled by fiduciary law.166
The Pegram case is too complex and implicates too
many policy considerations to simply conclude from the
Supreme Court’s analytical error that the outcome in that
case would or should have been different had the Court
applied the appropriate body of fiduciary law. However, it is
clear that fiduciary law may only be useful to organize
American health care relationships if courts, legislators,
and other analysts realize that a one size body of fiduciary
law does not fit all fiduciary relationships.
2. Physicians as Agents. Just as the trust is the
paradigmatic fiduciary arrangement, the physicianpatient
medical treatment interaction is the prototypical agency
relationship. The principalagent relationship is another
fiduciary relationship; it is also the form of fiduciary
relationship that correctly defines the transaction that
results when a patient entrusts her health care to a
166. Ironically, when the Pegram Court cited the role of the “traditional
trustee” to discard its application of fiduciary obligations to the defendant HMO,
the Court favorably made comparison to a fiduciary relationship in agency law.
Id. at 225. The Court compared the role of employers as fiduciaries who could
act in their own interests even when acting as fiduciaries for employees. But not
once did the Pegram Court consider that agency law was the proper body of
fiduciary law to apply to health care organizations even though the law of
agency in fact controls employers and employees even in the very example the
Court used:
Speaking of the traditional trustee, Professor Scott’s treatise
admonishes that the trustee “is not permitted to place himself in a
position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to the
beneficiaries.” 2A Scott § 170, at 311. Under ERISA, however, a
fiduciary may have financial interests adverse to beneficiaries.
Employers, for example, can be ERISA fiduciaries and still take actions
to the disadvantage of employee beneficiaries, when they act as
employers ( e.g., firing a beneficiary for reasons unrelated to the ERISA
plan), or even as plan sponsors ( e.g., modifying the terms of a plan as
allowed by ERISA to provide less generous benefits). Nor is there any
apparent reason in the ERISA provisions to conclude, as Herdrich
argues, that this tension is permissible only for the employer or plan
sponsor, to the exclusion of persons who provide services to an ERISA
plan.
Id. at 225.
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physician. In other words, the physician becomes the
patient’s agent. This is confirmed in the opening pages of
Pratt and Zeckhauser’s seminal work on agency law where
the authors lay the foundation for what I call the fiduciary
medicine model: “Whenever one individual depends on the
action of another, an agency relationship arises. The
individual taking the action is called the agent. The affected
part is the principal. In common parlance, the doctor is the
agent, the patient is the principal.”167
The agency relationship appeared in American law near
the end of the eighteenth century and continues to be
omnipresent in the business context. It explains and
regulates relationships between corporate directors and
shareholders, employees and employers, and unions and
laborers.168 But agency law only began to be applied
regularly to physicians and patients in the twentieth
century.169 The first principle of the fiduciary medicine
model is that it is the agency form of the fiduciary
relationship that primarily should guide the analysis of
health care treatment interactions between all forms of
medical providers and patients.
Agency is a form of fiduciary relation. It results when
one person consents to act on behalf of another, subject to
her control.170 To create an agency relationship, parties must
agree to an arrangement under which one—the agent—will
act as a representative of the other—the principal—and the
latter will agree to entrust his affairs to the former. There
need be no contract. However, the principal must have the
right to control the agent’s conduct with respect to the
matters entrusted to her.171 Conversely, the agent has a
duty to act.
167. John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An
Overview, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 2 (John W.
Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
168. Frankel, supra note 138, at 795.
169. See id. at 79596.
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §1.01 (2006).
171. Id. § 14. But compare principals and agents to masters and servants.
Both appear in the health care context. In some agency relationships, the
principal may not have direct control over the agent outside of the matter in
which the agent is acting on his behalf, as when an independent salesman
serves as an agent for a store owner or an emergency room physician who is an
independent contractor acts as an agent of the hospital under a contract to staff
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Both trusts and agencies are fiduciary relationships.
However, they are distinguishable in four fundamental
ways.172 First, in agency the fiduciary agent is subject to the
principal’s control, while in a trust, the fiduciary trustee is
not subject to the beneficiary’s control but only to the
obligation to deal with the trust property in accordance with
the terms of the trust.173
Second, an agent usually does not have title to the
principal’s property although he may be entrusted with the
job of passing title to the principal’s property as in a sale.174
However, a trustee holds legal title to the property that is
the subject of the trust as a result of a transfer of property
that creates the trust in the first place.
Third, the law imposes different liabilities on fiduciary
agents than it places on fiduciary trustees.175 For example,
agents may bind principals to liability in contract and tort
while acting within the scope of their agency, while trustees
have no power to bind beneficiaries.176 However, agents do
not bear the burden of liabilities imposed by law on property
owned by their principals, while trustees, not beneficiaries,
do have the legal liability of property owners.177 Thus, it is
the trustee, not the beneficiary, who must bring action to
recompense injuries to trust property, while in contrast the
principal, not the agent, must bring an action for injuries
against the principal’s property.178
Finally, an agency relationship is terminable at will by
either the principal or agent, and generally ends upon the
death of either party.179 The trust relationship usually is not
terminable at will by the beneficiaries or the trustee; this
relationship survives the death of any of these parties
the emergency department. However, where the principal has direct control over
every aspect of the agent’s work, the principal is a master and the agent is a
servant. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §1, cmts. d, e (2006).
172. See generally SCOTT ET AL., supra note 140, §2.3.4 at 6267.
173. Id. at 62.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 6263.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 63.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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unless the terms of the trust provide otherwise.180
Notwithstanding the fact that the law will allow a settlor to
reserve the right to revoke a trust, even this revocation will
not serve to make the relationship “a mere agency.”181
Agents and trustees share several fiduciary duties and
obligations that are directly applicable to the physician
patient relationship. The law imposes on agents a similar
fiduciary duty “to act loyally for the principal’s benefit” in
all matters connected with the agency relationship.182
Agents are responsible to subordinate their own interests
and the interests of third parties to the interests of their
principals.183 The agent may not acquire “a material benefit”
for himself in an action taken on behalf of the principal,
may not compete with the principal himself, and may not
assist others in competing with the principal.184 Where there
is property as the subject of the agency, the principal’s
property may not be used for the benefit of either the agent
or third parties.185 Agents do not hold title to the principal’s
property; thus, the agent has a duty to handle the property
so that it is apparent that the property owner is the
principal and not the agent.186 The agent must segregate
and not commingle the principal’s property, and must keep
accounts to report all transactions involving the property.187
However, these duties are subject to any agreement the
principal and agent reach together.188
The agent, like the trustee, owes a duty of
confidentiality in communications,189 and owes the principal
the duty to act with the care, competence, and diligence
usually exercised by agents in comparable situations.190 The
180. Id. at 64.
181. Id.
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
183. Id. §§ 8.018.05 (defining duty of loyalty).
184. Id. §§ 8.02, 8.04.
185. Id. § 8.05(1).
186. Id. § 8.12(1).
187. Id. § 8.12(2).
188. Id. § 8.12 (“An agent has a duty, subject to any agreement with the
principal.”) (emphasis added).
189. Id. § 8.05(2).
190. Id. § 8.08.
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agent’s duty of care, competence, and diligence may
emanate from the common law, statutes, regulations or
contractual agreements, but agency law, unlike the law of
negligence, does not depend on reference to a
reasonableness standard to define this duty.191 Also, an
agent’s duty may be modified by contract and a principal
may consent to permit conduct that would otherwise breach
the agent’s duty of care.192 An agent owes the principal a
duty to act reasonably and avoid engaging in conduct that
will likely damage the principal’s enterprise or reputation.193
It is said that the agent owes a “duty of good conduct.” 194
Courts speak in terms of what is reasonable195 and
material196 to disclose when they are describing the agent’s
duty to provide information. However, the agent’s fiduciary
duty of disclosure differs from the negligence duty because
of the impact that agreements between the principal and
agent can have on shaping that duty.197 Principals may
agree to limit the scope of an agent’s duty to disclose, or to
expand it.198 In fact, the Restatement says that it is really
the extent and nature of the principalagent relationship
that defines the scope of the agent’s duty to disclose.199
191. See id. § 8.08 & cmt. b.
192. See id. § 8.12 cmts. b,c.
193. Id. § 8.10.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Rookard v. Mexicoach, 680 F.2d 1257, 1263 (9th Cir. 1982)
(explaining that the scope of a travel agent’s duty of disclosure is limited to
what is reasonable under the circumstances).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Schwab, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 128687 (D. Wyo.
2000) (holding that an insurance agent’s duty was to disclose material
information to insurance company deciding whether to issue life insurance
policies).
197. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (2006).
198. See Jones v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 819 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (W.D.
Mich. 1993), aff’d, 27 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that where a principal
agent relationship was created by contract, that contract precluded the
application of “general principles of agency law”). But cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 381 cmt. a (1958) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Mandan v. Larsson,
271 N.W. 289, 291 (N.D. 1937)) (holding that even if an agreement was for an
agent to collect debt only, the agent should disclose information obtained in
collecting debt that makes it important for the principal to take immediate legal
action).
199. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 cmt. c (2006).
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The law of agency also defines the reciprocal duties that
a principal owes to the agent.200 Some mirror the duties just
described as obligations of the agent but they are not
fiduciary duties generally. For example, a manufacturer of
home health products that employs a salesman as its agent
owes its employee a fiduciary duty to deal fairly during
employment contract negotiations because the clinic is the
employee’s agent.201 A reciprocal duty requires the employee
principal to reveal important information to the agent, such
as known financial risks,202 and also requires the principal
to refrain from conduct that will injure the manufacturer’s
reputation and business.203
Certainly, this summary of the structure and
obligations that attend the agency relationship is not
intended to be comprehensive. Instead, this overview serves
the purpose of distinguishing the agency form of fiduciary
relationship that is relevant to physicians and patients, and
then, based on that distinction, identifying the specific legal
rules that define the agent’s fiduciary duties owed in the
medical treatment interaction. The next step in this
analysis acknowledges that all providers in American
health care are not individual physicians. Indeed, the
fiduciary model ably accommodates the variety of
institutional providers, some of which deliver health care in
the managed care setting. Managed care organizations,
health plans, and even the new ACOs created by the ACA
can deliver health care through a single entity that delivers
and finances medical care. Especially in light of the new
organizational landscape created by the ACA, the fiduciary
200. See id. §§ 8.138.15.
201. See id. § 8.13 cmt. b.
202. See Metro. Enter. Corp. v. United Techs. Int’l Corp., 2005 WL 2300382, at
*9 (D. Conn. 2005) (“The relationship between principal and agent is
confidential and fiduciary, and under this relationship, an agent owes his
principal a full duty of disclosure. A principal, on the other hand, has the
obligation to exercise good faith in the relationship and to disclose facts which, if
known, would likely cause the agent to suffer pecuniary loss.”) (quoting
McLendon v. Ga. Kaolin Co., 782 F. Supp. 1548, 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1992).
203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.15 cmt. d (2006); see also Taylor v.
Cordis Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (explaining that the
corporation principal, as part of a duty of good faith, would have to inform sales
agents of problems with products when there was a “concomitant threat to the
professional reputation of the sales agent”).

2011]

AMERICAN HEALTH CARE REFORM

759

care model must address the legal rules that govern
providers well beyond the paradigmatic physician. The
model must address provider organizations and networks
that both deliver and finance health care services because
these providers are fiduciaries, but they are not mere
agents. The next section explains this important distinction
to further refine the fiduciary medicine model.
3. Health Plans as Trustees. Remarkably, the simple
step of defining agency as the form of fiduciary relationship
that applies to the providerpatient relationship has a
powerful and farreaching corrective impact. But while this
step distinguishes fiduciary relationships within the health
care context, it does not erase the diversity of those
fiduciary relationships. Identifying that the fiduciary
relationship between a physician and patient is an agency
relationship and not a trusteeship provides much of what
health law scholars have found lacking in the fiduciary
doctrine over the past twentyfive years. Recall, for
example, that Mark Hall found the explanatory and
enforcement powers of fiduciary law “highly indeterminate,
despite its syllogistic mode, because fiduciary law does not
consist of an integrated body of concrete rules or precise
doctrine that applies uniformly to all forms of fiduciary
relationships.”204 Hall was right. No monotheism called
“fiduciary law” could possibly fit all forms of medical
relationships uniformly. In fact, some health care
relationships are properly characterized as, and analogized
to, trustee arrangements.
The law of trusts correctly describes those fiduciary
relationships in health care that involve the disposition of
property.205 The clearest case in point is the position
occupied by health plan administrators charged with paying
medical claims from a corpus of invested premiums that are
effectively held in trust to pay medical claim benefits. Plan
administrators collect, invest, and hold premiums as
property in order to pay medical claims from those invested
funds. Thus, a health plan administrator acts as a fiduciary
trustee for the benefit of enrollees or subscribers to the
health plan.

204. Hall, supra note 102, at 490.
205. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 12 (2003).
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In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the United
States Supreme Court addressed “the appropriate standard
of judicial review of benefit determinations by fiduciaries or
plan administrators under ERISA.”206 Applying Firestone to
resolve the conflict of interest that arises when an
employersponsored disability insurance plan administrator
is responsible both for determining a beneficiary’s eligibility
and paying benefits on claims, the Supreme Court in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Glenn concluded
that:
In “determining the appropriate standard of review,” a court
should be “guided by the principles of trust law”; in doing so, it
should analogize a plan administrator to the trustee of a common
law trust; and it should consider a benefit determination to be a
fiduciary act (i.e., an act in which the administrator owes a special
207
duty of loyalty to the plan beneficiaries).

The Metropolitan Life Court affirmed the decision to set
aside the insurer’s denial of longterm disability benefits
based in part on an analogy to trust law.208
Metropolitan Life confirms that health plan
administrators occupy a fiduciary role in making coverage
decisions and their role is analogous to the role of a
trustee.209 The four factors identified earlier to distinguish
agency from trust arrangements apply here to distinguish
providers who act as agents in a medical treatment
relationship, from providers who act as trustees in
administering health plan coverage decisions.210 First,
health plan administrators are obligated to exercise their
discretionary authority to make coverage determinations in
accordance with the terms of the health plan contract, but
they do not fall under the direct control of plan beneficiaries
or even employersponsors in making those decisions.211
Second, the plan administrator holds title to the premiums
that enrollees pay.212 The plan administrator uses the funds
206. 489 U.S. 101, 105 (1989).
207. 554 U.S. 105, 110, 111 (2008) (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 11113).
208. Id. at 11213, 119.
209. Id. at 111.
210. See SCOTT ET AL., supra note 142, § 2.3.4 at 62–67; supra pp. 75556.
211. See supra pp. 75556.
212. See id.
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to invest and pay benefits to satisfy claims. These invested
premium funds constitute the property a health plan
patient transfers to her provider. Third, the plan
administrator, unlike an agent, cannot bind employers or
employees in contract or tort while operating within the
scope of its fiduciary obligations.213 In Metropolitan Life, the
plan administrator was entitled to Social Security benefits
as a collateral source of compensation for the benefits it
paid.214 But the facts of this case reveal that only the
beneficiary could claim the funds from the Social Security
Administration, though the funds were ultimately paid to
the trustee administrator.215 On the other hand, the trustee
administrator, not the beneficiaries in Metropolitan Life,
would bear the legal liability of any losses or encumbrances
that might burden the invested funds.216 Finally, although
an agency relationship is terminable at will by either party
and generally ends on the death of the principal or the
agent, the trust relationship established by the health plan
contract would survive the death of a beneficiary, as would
the duty to cover a claim arising from medical care
delivered before the beneficiary’s death.217
In summary, the Metropolitan Life decision illustrates
the relevance of the law of trusts to regulate certain
relationships between patients and health plan providers.218
Moreover, the case provides the second principle upon
which to build an accurate fiduciary medicine model—the
fiduciary medicine model applies agency law to govern
provider relationships that involve only the delivery of
health care services, while the model applies the law of
trusts to those health care relationships that accomplish the
disposition of property. Whether acting as agents or
trustees, most major stakeholders in America’s new health
care delivery and financing system will operate in a
fiduciary capacity. However, the majority of fiduciary
relationships operating in American health care, and the
majority of those likely to emerge from implementation of
213. See id.
214. Metropolitan Life, 554 U.S. at 109.
215. See id.
216. See supra pp. 75556.
217. See id.
218. See Metropolitan Life, 554 U.S. at 11213.
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the ACA, are best described as agency, not trust fiduciary
relationships. The next section explains why.
B. Beyond Physicians and Patients
The explanatory strength of the fiduciary medicine
model increases exponentially when agency law is applied
beyond cases involving individual physicianpatient or
insuredinsurer relationships, to other health care
interactions. A series of complex and overlapping agency
relationships comprise the American health care system
and, as discussed earlier, are likely to proliferate under the
ACA.219 Moreover, the ACA considerably expands the
government’s financial role in regulating and sustaining
health care markets.220 Beginning in 2013, the federal
government will subsidize access to private health
insurance markets through premium assistance tax
credits.221 The federal government will pay for expansion of
the public insurance market as well; from 2014 to 2020, the
government will cover between 90% and 100% of the cost of
extending Medicaid to childless adults with incomes up to
133% of the federal poverty level.222
When the ACA is fully implemented, the state and
federal governments will be the most influential fiduciary
219. See supra Section I, text accompanying notes 1924. The two most
prominent expansions will be through statewide entities that will market
insurance and new, integrated provider organizations; both will introduce
numerous new market players. Under Sections 13011321 of the ACA, each
state must create or join insurance exchanges that will market and regulate
insurance. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 18021
18024, 1803118033, 18041 (West Supp. 2010). Section 3022 introduces
Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”), new provider organizations that will
receive incentives to encourage them to take advantage of shared savings. Id. §
1395jjj.
220. See supra Section I, text accompanying notes 2640.
221. 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West Supp. 2010).
222. See BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH CARE REFORM SUPPLEMENT TO HEALTH
LAW CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 14647 (6th ed. 2010). The Congressional
Budget Office has estimated that sixteen million new recipients will be eligible
to receive Medicaid coverage, at an estimated cost to the federal government of
$434 billion between 2010 and 2019, and $20 billion to the states during the
same period. Id.; see also Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program
Provisions in the New Health Reform Law, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 12 (Apr.
6, 2010), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/795203.pdf.
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actors in the complex network of agency relationships that
will deliver, finance, and regulate health care in America. In
this role, government entities will be responsible to
represent two principals: the American patient population
and the American public generally.223 I assert that the rules
and procedures that govern fiduciary relationships provide
the best legal regime to order the new organizational
structures introduced under the ACA and monitor the
expanded role that state and federal governments will
occupy. The following hypothetical scenario is illustrative.
1. Mercy Medical Hospital—A Managed Care Scenario.
In the new health care landscape, a single institution can be
simultaneously involved in a complex network of
relationships; in some of these relationships, an institution
serves as principal, while in others, it serves as agent. To
sketch out a few of these relationships—imagine a single
fictional hospital. Call it Mercy Medical Hospital (“Mercy
Medical”). Mercy Medical stands in an agency relationship
as principal to many who provide health care on its
premises. Mercy Medical acts as a principal on behalf of its
directlyhired employees, such as nurses and lab
technicians, and operates as a principal with respect to the
independent contractor physicians who provide inhouse
services, such as radiologists, hospitalists, and emergency
department physicians. In the agency relationship between
Mercy Medical and other physicians—the surgeons and
internists with admitting privileges at the hospital—Mercy
Medical typically has less control. Nevertheless, the law
may hold Mercy Medical responsible as a principal for the
negligent acts of any of these physicians if the hospital
exercises sufficient control over them in these agency
relationships.224 By enforcing quality assurance standards,
conducting peer review hearings, or imposing privileging
restrictions, Mercy Medical may not only act as the
principal to these physicians, but also as an agent for
patients who expect high quality medical services from the
hospital.
223. See THOMAS E. GETZEN, HEALTH ECONOMICS: FUNDAMENTALS AND FLOW OF
FUNDS 349 (1997).
224. See, e.g., Sampson v. Contillo, 865 N.Y.S.2d 634, 63738 (App. Div. 2008)
(holding that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the hospital had an
agency relationship with a radiologist, and that the issue of fact precluded
granting summary judgment to the hospital).
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In its relationships with members of the health care
network outside the hospital, Mercy Medical may have
further agency responsibilities. Mercy Medical may be in a
contractual relationship with a health plan or insurer. In
this case, Mercy may implement quality assurance and
utilization reviews to discharge its responsibility as an
agent of the payers who set cost containment objectives to
control reimbursements to the hospital for patient care. As
a result of the ACA, Mercy Medical is likely to participate in
an ACO, for example, in which it contractually links itself
with other providers to serve Medicare and privately
insured patients using integrated evidenceinformed
medical systems, comprehensive patient care bundling, and
salarybased payment systems.
If Mercy Medical is a private, forprofit institution, the
hospital then owes a fiduciary obligation to its shareholder
principals.225 However, if Mercy Medical is a nonprofit
hospital, it owes a fiduciary duty to the foundation or
charity that has organized the hospital under its charter or
founding documents, and quite possibly even to the
225. Professors Mark Loewenstein and William Wang question the wisdom of
holding out a corporate entity as an agent of its shareholders. See Mark J.
Loewenstein & William K.S. Wang, The Corporation as Insider Trader, 30 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 45, 4753 (2005). They point out that courts have reached mixed
results on the question of whether a corporation owes a fiduciary duty to
individual shareholders who have competing interests and no direct control over
corporate directors. Id. at 48. Because of the overwhelming consensus in
literature and common law, the lesson I take from the insightful analysis by
Professors Loewenstein and Wang is that agency relationships are not uniform.
Principals have varying degrees of control over the agents who act on their
behalf. Multiple principals may have competing interests among themselves and
even interests that conflict with their agents to some degree. In closelyheld
corporations, corporate directors (who are often majority shareholders) may owe
a higher fiduciary responsibility to shareholders than is owed to those in a
larger entity. See, e.g., Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989);
Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). A hospital with
significant control over staff radiologists may be held vicariously liable for those
doctors’ negligence, while the same hospital may have considerably less control
over a multispecialty group of doctors who work at the hospital as independent
contractors. See Sampson, 865 N.Y.S.2d at 637. The latter group may be
comprised of physicians with conflicting interests and the hospital may not have
an employment contract with any of them, but an agency relationship can still
exist between the hospital and these doctors if the elements of the law of agency
are satisfied. See id. In sum, neither the number of principals, the diversity of
their interests, nor the fact that their control over their representative is
indirect dispositively precludes a finding that agency exists.
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government which has forgone tax revenue in order to
support its nonprofit status.226 If Mercy Medical is a
publiclyowned hospital, then it is reasonable to conclude
that its agency obligations run to the municipality or
government that chartered the hospital, and ultimately to
the people who pay taxes to support its services. In all these
relationships, Mercy Medical simultaneously acts as an
agent of the patients who use its facilities; it is, at bottom, a
provider of medical care. Moreover, agency theory allows us
to conceive of the host roles that Mercy Medical and other
actors in health care occupy as both agents and principals.
Home health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, nursing
homes, and pharmaceutical companies all owe some level of
fiduciary duties as agents, subagents, and dualagents to
one another and to the patients they ultimately serve.
This network of relationships would benefit from clear
and predictable rules of agency law to organize the
discharge of these fiduciary duties in health care
interactions. This is the work of the fiduciary medicine
model. Health economists have been unraveling the
structure of these organizational relationships for over
fortyfive years, and a brief look at their literature sheds
considerable light on the network of health care
relationships that agency law can order.227 The ubiquity of
agency relationships in our health care system is not news
to health economists who have used economic tools to
describe this phenomenon for years. While it is beyond the
scope of this Article to comprehensively explore that
literature in light of the understandings about medical
agencies developed here, a brief look at basic economic
agency theory is a worthwhile exercise for our purposes.
One cautionary note is in order before turning to the
economic literature. I employ the analytical tools offered by
health economists as descriptive assets, not normative ones.
My purpose for looking at the basic principles of agency
theory as applied to health care agencies is to organize the
relevant legal relationships and provide a systematic way of
226. See Lukes v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 976 A.2d 609, 62224 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2009) (finding that agreements between a nonprofit health plan and the state
were products of an agency relationship).
227. The seminal work in this field was written in 1963. See Kenneth J.
Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941 (1963).
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identifying some of the operational questions that these
agency relationships raise. For example, while most health
economists would probably agree about the centrality of the
agency relationship,228 there is disagreement about: “(a) who
the decision maker is and (b) whether there is more than
health in the patient’s utility function.”229 Indeed agency in
health economics seems very much a descriptive technique
rather than an analytical tool.
The essential point to be taken here is that the
economists’ agency theory is not used to suggest, much less
choose, between a market or government, public or private,
contractarian or egalitarian solution to the questions of how
to organize a health system. In fact, I affirmatively disavow
the ability of these analytical tools to make such a choice.
The single most important conclusion to draw from this
analysis is that patients remain the driving principals at
the core of all health agency relationships. Therefore, the
important work of deciding what solutions should apply to
the conflicts that arise in agency relationships must focus
on the best interests of the principal, who the law must
support as the controlling decision maker in order to
operate consistently with the fiduciary rules of agency. With
this important caveat understood, a few basic observations
provided by the economic literature are in order.
Economists have long accepted the concept of an agency
relationship between a physician and a patient.230 More
importantly, economists have identified and described the
chief shortcoming of this and all other agency
relationships—the problem of nonalignment.231 Whereas
“[t]he perfect agent physician is one who chooses as the
228. See Mandy Ryan, Agency in Health Care: Lessons for Economists from
Sociologists, 53 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 207, 207 (1994) (arguing that the concept of
agency is widely accepted). But cf. Gavin Mooney & Mandy Ryan, Agency
Principles in Health Care: Getting Beyond First Principles, 12 J. HEALTH ECON.
125, 125 (1993) (arguing that agency theory raises more questions than supplies
answers when applied to physicianpatient relations).
229. Gavin Mooney, Communitarianism and Health Economics, in THE SOCIAL
ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 40, 4344 (John B. Davis ed., Routledge 2001).
230. See, e.g., SHERMAN FOLLAND
HEALTH CARE 206 (5th ed. 2007).

ET AL.,

THE ECONOMICS

OF

HEALTH

AND

231. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm, 3 J. FINANCIAL ECON. 305, 30560 (arguing that separation of ownership
and control leads to conflict of interest).
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patients themselves would choose if only the patients
possessed the information that the physician does,”232 in
reality it has been shown through empirical studies that
physician and nurse preferences diverge from patient
wishes, and that the agency itself is not perfect.233 When
conflicts of interest arise, physicians do not always act in a
patient’s best interest; ensuring that physicians do so
through contractual means is not always possible.234
Moreover, the problem of physicians acting as agents is
exacerbated by their role as agent for a second principal—
the payer.235
Dranove and White catalogued the nowclassic list of
problems that arise when agents’ interests diverge from
those of their principals in health care.236 The uncertainty of
delivering health care is generally exacerbated where these
problems prevail. Principals cannot adequately control the
conduct of their agents because monitoring is either
232. FOLLAND ET AL., supra note 230, at 207.
233. See Einat Neuman & Shoshana Neuman, Agency in Healthcare: Are
Medical Caregivers Perfect Agents?, CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH
(Discussion Paper Series No. 6612) (2007), www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP6612.asp.
Using Discrete Choice Experiments, the authors evaluated the preferences of
323 women who had recently given birth with respect to privacy of rooms,
attitude of staff, professionalism of medical staff, information availability, and
travel time to the hospital, and then compared their preferences to thirty staff
members of a large Israeli public hospital. Id. at 45. From the observed
differences in these two groups’ preferences, the authors conclude that “[t]he
clear empirical finding is that the agent has a biased perception of the
principal’s preferences and therefore perfect agency does not exist. . . .
[Therefore] [i]nforming the unaware medical caregivers about the patients’
preferences, will improve treatment and patients’ satisfaction.” Id. at 8.
234. See id.; Eduardo Bruera et al., Patient Preferences Versus Physician
Perceptions of Treatment Decisions in Cancer Care, 91 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY
2883 (2001); Mark Ebell et al., The DoNotResuscitate Order: A Comparison of
Physician and patient Preferences and DecisionMaking, 91 AM. J. OF MED. 255
(1991) (noting similarities and differences between physicians and patients in
making DNR decisions).
235. “In the area of provider reimbursement, the provider, acting as an agent,
faces two principals: the patients and, when there is health insurance, the
insurers.” PHILIP JACOBS & JOHN RAPOPORT, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND
MEDICAL CARE 148 (5th ed. 2004).
236. See generally David Dranove & William D. White, Agency and the
Organization of Health Care Delivery, in II HEALTH ECONOMICS: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 233, 23545 (Anthony J. Culyer ed., 2006).
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impossible or prohibitively expensive. For example, the
information asymmetry between the agent and the principal
increases the transaction costs of monitoring and the
likelihood that the agent will be an imperfect representative
of the agent’s interests.237 The agent may then squander the
principal’s resources and profits by allowing bias to
influence purchasing decisions, investing lavishly in their
own selfinterest, acting too conservatively in avoiding risks
the principal would rather take, or acting slothfully so as
not to fully pursue the principal’s priorities and interests.238
Additionally, patients incur a series of transaction costs
associated with each of the providers who furnish medical
care: search costs to determine the services needed,
contracting costs to reach agreement as to the types and
terms of these services and the agreed upon prices, and
enforcement costs to ensure that they have met agreed
performance objectives.239 Individual patients lack the
information needed to make these transactionrelated
determinations, increasing the agency and transaction costs
further. However, in the modern American health care
delivery network, the agency relationships are attenuated
by the fact that not only have networks of providers become
complex and extended, but patients also have aggregated to
form purchasing groups or classes of enrollees, beneficiaries,
and subscribers. The fiduciary medicine model helps to
organize the diversity of patient interests that characterize
modern health care markets deeply penetrated by managed
care organizations and the new provider groups that the
ACA introduces. The next section explains how the fiduciary
medicine model serves to align the diverse interests of large
patient populations with their provider fiduciaries.
2. Patients as Enrollees, Subscribers and Beneficiaries.
The array of providers and payers that interact with
patients in today’s health care market do not encounter
individual patients qua patients, but rather encounter and
contract with patients as their agents in aggregate groups.
In 2010, national managed care enrollment reached 135.4
million people; this meant that 43.8.% of Americans are
enrolled in managed care programs that operate as agents
through Medicare and Medicaid payers, or private
237. See id. at 236.
238. See id. at 24143.
239. JACOBS & RAPOPORT, supra note 235, at 87.
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employers.240 These patients do not establish individual
agency relationships with Managed Care Organizations
(“MCOs”), but contract as groups with their agent
organizations. Significantly, patients and their physician
agents are increasingly less likely to be engaged in the one
onone agency relationship that has provided the
prototypical agency model.241 Today, the patient in the
fiduciary medicine model must be seen as a member of a
group of principals that distantly controls many different
providers through various agency and subagency
arrangements that includes payers, managed care
organizations, hospitals, insurers, health plans, longterm
care facilities, home health agencies, pharmaceutical firms
and physicians. MCOs create networks to serve aggregated
groups of patients who seek services through employers or
other aggregating institutions. Employers go into the
market to obtain insurance products on behalf of groups of
employees.242
The question of who can represent the patient
understates the reality that the patient is an aggregated
population. This population is comprised of the employed
and the unemployed; citizens and aliens; adults and
children; the wealthy, the poor, and those in between; the
240. Managed Care Fact Sheets—National Statistics, MCOL, http://www.mcar
eol.com/factshts/factnati.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2010); Paul Mackun & Steven
Wilson, Population Distribution and Change: 2000 to 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Mar. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br01.pdf.
241. Physician practice patterns have changed to meet the needs of the new
provider environment. The number of solo practice physicians is declining, and
physicians are aggregating into larger groups and providing care in multiple
specialties. In 20042005, the proportion of physicians in solo or twophysician
practices had decreased to 32.5%, down from 40.7% in 19961997. COUNCIL ON
LONG RANGE PLANNING & DEV., AM. MED. ASSOC., HEALTH CARE TRENDS 2008, at
57 (2008). In 1996 physician practices with eleven or more physicians
represented 15.6% of all officebased doctors. Id. By 1999, that percentage had
increased to 18.5% of all officebased practices. Id. This trend of physicians
concentrating within a single practice group increases the likelihood that
physicians will share patients rather than remain in a single physicianpatient
relationship. Clearly, the physicianpatient relationship that stands at the core
of the agency model that we have been discussing up to this point has changed
to a larger, more complex interaction.
242. Dayna Bowen Matthew, Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of
EmploymentBased Health Insurance, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1038
(1996).
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young and the elderly; the very healthy and the very ill; and
those of different racial, cultural, and religious
backgrounds. In other words, the patients who consume
health care are a collective principal population with
divergent and sometimes competing interests.243
These trends are precisely the phenomena Rodwin
pointed to as the three sources of “strain” on the fiduciary
metaphor.244 However, unlike Rodwin, I do not conclude that
the future of the fiduciary model is dim.245 Instead, I propose
to adopt a more comprehensive model of fiduciary
obligations—one that fits the health care delivery
relationships paradigmatically, viewing a full range of
health care actors as agents of patient groups—to replace
the gardenvariety fiduciary that has ceased to fit today’s
health care industry. To accomplish this transition, I offer
economic agency theory as an apt descriptor to organize the
complexity of the agency relationships that occur between
networks of providers and financiers who supply medical
goods and services, and the aggregated collections of
consumers who directly and indirectly purchase health care
services.
Dranove and White show how familiar agency costs are
multiplied throughout the health care delivery system.246 In
addition to the physicianpatient agency relationship
explored earlier, other health care providers, including
hospitals, longterm care and skilled nursing facilities,
home health agencies, managed care organizations,
governments, and employers are also agents in our
system.247 All of these providers operate as fiduciaries in
their capacity as agents of the groups of patients that enroll,
subscribe to, or are contractually named as beneficiaries to
their services. To these patient populations, they owe the
same duties of loyalty, disclosure, confidentiality, care,
competence, and diligence as physicians do in their
relationships with individual patients. Yet, whatever
competing priorities physician agents face when providing
243. Id. at 1039.
244. Rodwin, supra note 70, at 253.
245. Id. at 255 (pointing to a growing scholarship advocating that we dispense
with fiduciary obligations in favor of determining obligations by contract).
246. Dranove & White, supra note 236, at 239.
247. See JACOBS & RAPOPORT, supra note 235, at 148.

2011]

AMERICAN HEALTH CARE REFORM

771

care to their individual patients are multiplied significantly
when institutional providers seek to fulfill their fiduciary
responsibilities to a large, diverse patient population. A
closer look first at patient relationships with hospital
providers, and then with payers such as managed care
organizations, will provide two illustrations of the
complexity of conflicting agency relationships that exist in
serving patient groups.
Most hospitals proclaim that their primary concern is
the patient.248 However, “this sort of general assertion does
not address how prices are set, the tradeoff between one
group of patients and another (e.g., surgery or
immunization, abortion or family planning clinics), or the
tradeoffs between employees and doctors.”249 The hospitals’
incentives are complicated further by the fact that each
possible ownership structure will create another layer of
agency relationships.250 Administrators of nonprofit
hospitals, now over 68% of hospital providers in the United
States,251 stand in an agency relationship representing their
board of trustees, religious order, or governing foundation.
By analogy, even those hospitals in America which are
publicly owned may be considered agents of the governing
locality that incorporated the hospital. The agency analysis
extends to describe the nonprofit hospital as a subagent of
the government that has delegated the duty to provide
health care to the indigent. For example, by enacting a
favorable tax code, the government (acting as a principal)
has delegated charitable care duties to nonprofit hospitals
to behave as agents in exchange for foregone tax revenues.252
Whatever their ownership structures, hospitals, like every
other provideragent, are subject to the control of multiple
248. GETZEN, supra note 223, at 175.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 17475.
251. See Health, United States, 2010, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., 372 tbl.113 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus10.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Health, United States, 2010].
252. Fred Joseph Hellinger, TaxExempt Hospitals and Community Benefits:
A Review of State Reporting Requirements, 34 J. HEALTH POL’Y & L. 37 (2009);
see also James E. Tyrell, III, NonProfits Under Fire: The Effects of Minimal
Charity Requirements Legislation on NotforProfit Hospitals, 26 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 373 (2010); L. Seaton et al., Tax Exempt Hospitals and
Community Benefit, 21 HEALTH LAW 37 (2009).
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principals. All these fiduciary relationships operate in
tension with the hospital’s professed commitment to “the
patient above all.” Yet, hospitals must declare allegiance to
this priority in order to attract patients.
The agency framework highlights the way that third
party payers act as principals on behalf of patient groups
using different payment systems to control hospitals in this
setting.253 The payer’s choice to contract for either
retrospective or prospective reimbursement per diem, per
case, or per admission reimbursement, or even the structure
of fee schedules, is a reflection of the ways in which payers
attempt to control hospitals and cause their interests to re
align with the costminimizing priorities of the patient and
the payer.254 Thus, when thirdparty payers are organized as
MCOs, they may also be seen to function in dual roles as
both a principal and an agent in each of these provider
relationships. As principals, they seek to monitor and
minimize the cost of delivering
health care using
gatekeepers,
utilization
reviews,
precertification
requirements, withholds, and other financial incentives.255
At the same time, because nearly 90% of MCO funds flow
from employee benefit plans,256 MCO managers serve as
agents acting on behalf of the employees who are, at bottom,
the patients who drive the health care network. Yet these
employees’ interests may not always align with their
employers who contract for their medical care.257 MCOs act
as patients’ agents when they create networks that
employers (acting as patient subagents) can offer in lieu of
wages to their employees.258 In these relationships, the
patientprincipals are faced with controlling the conduct of
at least three layers of agents: their employers, the health
plans with which they contract, and the providers engaged
by managed care health plans. In order to minimize the
253. JACOBS & RAPOPORT, supra note 235, at 154156.
254. See id.
255. Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for
Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1976
(2003); Dionne Koller Fine, Physician Liability and Managed Care: A
Philosophical Perspective, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 641, 647 (2003).
256. GETZEN, supra note 223, at 216.
257. Matthew, supra note 242, at 1037.
258. See id. at 1038.
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deleterious impact of the divergence between patients’
interests and the interests of each layer of agency, patients
would ideally only pay plans to reimburse providers who
delivered the desired health outcomes—for example, a cure
for every malady. But of course this is impossible.
Therefore, agency law can serve to realign the patients’
interests as principals with the interests of their employers,
providers, and thirdparty payers. This is the third principle
of the fiduciary medicine model—the model provides
substantive and procedural rules that realign the diverse
interests of patient groups who contract through their
employers or other agents to obtain health care from
integrated provider organizations.
The primary fiduciary responsible to deliver health care
to American patients under the ACA is no longer the
individual physician or even independently operating
institutional firms, but instead providers acting as part of a
network of agents, subagents, principals, and coprincipals.
This new fiduciary will no longer serve just an individual
patient, but must act to coordinate services on behalf of a
collective principal—the American patient population. The
agency rules of law that make up the fiduciary medicine
model can contribute a legal order to providers, patients,
and payers that will clarify obligations, protect the
responsible exercise of professional judgment, and
incentivize the realignment of patient, payer, and provider
interests. However, these rules are incomplete without
considering the role of the manager responsible for creating,
financing, and stabilizing the health care markets in which
all other agents, trustees, and principles operate. This
section has provided the third element of the fiduciary
medicine model: fiduciary rules and procedure are suited to
align the diverse array of interests and actors in the health
care markets. The next section completes the fiduciary
medicine model by explaining the quintessentially fiduciary
role that government occupies in the health care market.
C. The State as Fiduciary in Health Care
The agency relationship is at the core of our democratic
form of government.259 Organized originally to reflect the
259. David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO.
L.J. 723, 723 (2009).
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terms of corporate charters, each of the colonies evolved into
sovereigns that ultimately ceded authority to the federal
government to act on their behalf as an agent. I therefore
extend the economic agency theory of the state, based on
these historic facts, to explain that in passing the ACA,
Congress acted within its fiduciary capacity as an agent to
accomplish what the people of the United States could not
accomplish independently, or could not accomplish well
apart from their government. I argue that this legal
authority is constrained by the ethical duties that
accompany all fiduciary medical relationships. This section
shows that the state operates as a fiduciary agent as a
descriptive matter of history and positive law. Next, this
section explores the normative force of this premise in the
delivery of health care, particularly by showing that
governments ought to be held to a fiduciary standard. This
argument is supported first by analogical reasoning to show
that the structure of other recognized fiduciary
relationships—particularly those between physicians, other
providers, and patients—are instructive. Then, I will
demonstrate the strong empirical and pragmatic grounds
for adding the relationship between the state, acting
through governments, and its people to the category of
agency relationships that provide health care to patients. I
conclude this section by arguing that the fiduciary medicine
model provides ample justification for the view that
Congressional enactment of the ACA provided near
universal access to health care to discharge a fiduciary
obligation of the state.260
1. The Descriptive Case for the State as Fiduciary Agent.
The principalagent relationship “lies at the heart of
democratic government.”261 In this form of government, the
people stand in the office of principals, and delegate their
power to government officials who are their agents. The
people employ mechanisms such as their right to vote,
participate in juries, and judicial review of government
decisions to minimize agency costs that arise from self
dealing or when the interest of the government as agent

260. I am indebted to Drs. Paul Miller and Charles Weijer for the outline of my
argument in this section; I found their argument persuasive in Fiduciary
Obligation in Clinical Research, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 424 (2006).
261. Law, supra note 259, at 723.
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diverges from the interests of the people.262 These roots of
the democratic agency in American government predate the
United States Constitution.
In the United States, constitutions arose first from the
corporate charters that formed the governing documents for
the trading companies that later became colonies. In each
colony, the people constituted a governing body as an
agency and granted, limited, and controlled the
government’s exercise of power through charters.263 “The
colonists generally came to understand these corporate
charters as ‘constitutions’ in the modern American sense—
foundational political instruments constituting and limiting
governmental power.”264 From this nation’s inception, “[l]ike
corporate officers, government officials were merely agents
of principals who had prescribed limits on the agents’ power
in the founding charter.”265 From the perspective of its
delegated power to provide for the common good, our state
and federal governing bodies operate as corporate agencies,
in which the peopleprincipals have delegated the power to
accomplish the goals of the sovereign.
Chief Justice John Marshall affirmed this agency
relationship as one of “common sense” by declaring, “the
whole political system is founded on the idea that the
departments of government are the agents of the nation.”266
Modern theorists have carried this foundational principle
forward and described it as the doctrine of “popular
sovereignty.” In the words of Professor Carlos González,
“[t]he central idea of popular sovereignty is that the people
are the one and only sovereign in a civil society; as
sovereign the people may cede governing authority to a
constituted government, which is charged with the duty to
pursue publicregarding policies.”267 The corporate analogy
to the governmental agency relationship has also remained
262. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.
1131, 1132 (1991).
263. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425,
143233 (1987).
264. Id. at 1433.
265. Id. at 1434.
266. See Marshall, supra note 16, at 211.
267. Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 585, 636 (1996).
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apt over the centuries as Justice Iredell wrote in 1793,
“[a]ny body politic (sole or aggregate) whether its power be
restricted or transcendent, is in this sense ‘a corporation.’ . .
. In this extensive sense, not only each State singly, but
even the United States may without impropriety be termed
‘corporations.’”268 Professor Akil Amar notes that “[t]he
analogy between corporate charters and political
constitutions had profound implications.”269 Certainly, not
all of the implications that result from the analogy were
apparent to early colonial leaders, but the important point
for this analysis is to appreciate the ubiquity of the
corporate analogy that Professor Amar describes as having
“seeped deep into the thought patterns of the men who
would eventually label themselves Federalists in 1787.”270
The analogy remains pervasive today, according to
Professor González:
Much as the law of agency or the law of trusts sets forth rules that
guide and constrain corporate agents and trustees, under popular
sovereignty theory constitutions, [statutes, and regulations] set
forth rules guiding and constraining an agent/government.
Ideally, a constitution [statute, or regulation] affords the
agent/government enough power so that it may act for the good
and betterment of the principal/people, but at the same time
constrains the agent/government from engaging in selfdealing
271
policies or policies at odds with the public interest.

To say that a state, acting through its constituted
government, acts as the agent of its citizens is not to make a
normative judgment about the manner or extent to which a
government should intervene in the delivery of health care
in order to accomplish the priorities of its people. Instead,
the fact that government functions as an agent is a
description of the most fundamental agency relationship
relevant to the fiduciary medicine model. The observation
that government functions as the agent of its citizens272 may
conjure up fears of governmental inefficiency, waste, or a
268. Amar, supra note 263, at 1433 (quoting Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419, 447 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.)).
269. Id. at 143334.
270. Id.
271. González, supra note 267, at 637 (statutory and regulatory references
added).
272. See GETZEN, supra note 223, at 349.
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political agenda as extreme as “socialized medicine.”
Indeed, the American government could have acted as the
people’s agent in reforming the health care system by
completely taking over the production of health care goods
and services, financing its endeavors by a tax disbursed
through a single payer system, and regulating the cost of
health care through a global budget. But clearly the
American government did not take this socialized medicine
approach under the ACA. Instead, the United States
Congress acted in its capacity as agent to ensure that health
care markets operate competitively and with as little
interference as possible by enforcing all private agreements,
facilitating the free flow of information among competitors
and purchasers, and minimizing regulatory oversight.
The most important point here is not to advocate or
advance a particular approach to the agency function that
government performs. Instead, the goal is to correctly
describe the government’s agency function so that the same
legal tools available to manage all other agency
relationships might also be considered to ensure that
government will act in the furtherance of its principal’s
objectives. Professor Getzen quotes Abraham Lincoln to
describe “[t]he Role of Government” in the chapter of his
health economics text by the same name: “To do for the
people what needs to be done, but which they cannot, by
individual effort, do at all, or do so well, for themselves.”273
My argument is that the fiduciary rules of agency provide
legal support, justification, and even incentive for a decision
by the American government to do for the American people
what they as principals have determined needs to be done
for patient populations, but which no individual patient or
patient population can do well for themselves.274
2. The Normative Case for the State as Fiduciary Agent.
In order to determine whether, as a matter of principle,
the relationship between the government and patients
273. Id. at 334.
274. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the causes of action that
may be brought against the state for breach of fiduciary duty owed to citizens.
However, these actions are bound to arise if the fiduciary medicine model is
adopted. Courts may be guided by the rich body of case law that describes
lawsuits brought by Native Americans against the government to recover for
breach of fiduciary obligations that the government owes in managing land. See,
e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
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should be recognized as a fiduciary relationship, we can
turn to statements about what a fiduciary relationship
ought to accomplish. Professor Deborah DeMott’s
instrumentalist description of a fiduciary is a useful point of
departure.275 In her landmark article, Professor DeMott set
out to develop a general theory of the fiduciary obligation
that would serve both a retrospective and a prospective
purpose.276 First, DeMott sought to correct what she saw as
an erroneous reliance on contract law to support previous
theories of the fiduciary obligation,277 thus rejecting theories
that described the fiduciary obligation as one characterized
by voluntariness, entrustment, unjust enrichment, and
dependency.278 Prospectively, DeMott articulated a general
theory that provides the analytical grounds to justify
identifying fiduciary relationships beyond the conventional
categories.279 DeMott concluded that “the fiduciary
obligation is a device that enables the law to respond to a
range of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one
person’s discretion ought to be controlled because of
characteristics of that person’s relationship with another.”280
A fiduciary relationship, then, is one in which discretion
ought to be controlled by law. DeMott, it turns out, has
indeed identified a normative characteristic of fiduciary
relationships.
All fiduciary relationships are characterized by an
inherent risk that the fiduciary might abuse the power
entrusted to her/it, and that the mechanisms for defending
against this abuse outside the law are inadequate.281
Corporate directors may compromise the value of investors’
shares; trustees may squander the corpus of a trust;
business partners may encumber one another’s assets. In
each of these cases, the victim of abuse entrusted the
abusing party with the discretion and power that was
ultimately used to harm. Moreover, in each case, the
275. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879 (1988).
276. Id.
277. See id. at 88588.
278. See id. at 87980.
279. Id. at 880.
280. Id. at 915.
281. See Frankel, supra note 138, at 808.
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entrusting party had no ability to monitor the fiduciary’s
behavior or punish the harm. The reasons to recognize these
relationships as fiduciary are to facilitate entrustment and
provide control for the imbalance in power.
Professor Melvin Eisenberg has convincingly argued
that in addition to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
that corporate managers owe to shareholders, the law also
imposes a duty of good faith that encompasses an obligation
to act with honesty, decency, consistency with prevailing
corporate norms, and fidelity to the office entrusted to
them.282 Eisenberg argued that these expanded obligations
are needed to establish a legal standard of conduct and
provide more specific obligations than the general duties of
loyalty and care.283 Moreover, Eisenberg observed that a
broader duty of good faith will address conduct that falls
outside the baseline duties of loyalty and care—conduct
protected by the business judgment rule or that may not
cause financial harm, but that nonetheless represents a
“high degree of wrongfulness.”284 The duty of good faith
requires corporate managers to respond to social norms and
changes in social interests and priorities.285 This duty of
good faith imposes obligations of candor.286 The duty of
candor augments the duty to inform and the obligation to
act through acceptable norms and processes that extend
beyond the liability rules.287 Indeed, the duty of candor looks
at the ends achieved by corporate agents to examine the
appropriateness of the procedures chosen to achieve those
ends.288
This fiduciary duty of candor that controls agency in the
corporate context is needed in the health care context to
control the government’s exercise of discretion where the
power imbalance between agent and principals is great.
Fiduciary rules may require honesty, sincerity, and fidelity
282. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006).
283. Id. at 26.
284. Id. at 29.
285. Id. at 3031.
286. Id. at 38.
287. Id. at 5051.
288. Id. at 38.
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far beyond the levels of ordinary actors, and may require
the government’s responsiveness to social norms. These
normative justifications for the application of fiduciary law
to corporate directors and officers apply with multiplied
force to the governments that finance, administer, and
deliver health care to Americans.
The primary payer in the United States health care
system is the United States Government. In 2008, for
example, America’s national health expenditures totaled
$2.3 trillion.289 Personal health care expenditures accounted
for $1.95 trillion of that amount.290 Nearly half—46.5%—of
those expenditures were paid by federal, state, or local
governments.291 That is to say that in 2008, the government
was the source of funding for 56.9% of all hospital care;
34.7% of all physician and clinical care; 62.2% of all nursing
home care; 79.1% of all home health care; and 37.2% of all
prescription drug expenditures.292 In its role as “payerin
chief,” the government is the system’s largest principal
controlling each of these providers in the dual agency
relationship that operates as the providers deliver care to
patients they treat. Yet in each of these relationships, by
expending public funds, the government is also acting as the
agent of the citizenry that provides the money to purchase
these services through tax revenues and Medicare
premiums.293
Even beyond its role as primary payer, the state,
through government, plays a pervasive role in discharging
its fiduciary responsibilities as agent of the American
citizens throughout the health care delivery system. In
2008, for example, the government paid $69.4 billion (3% of
total national health expenditures) in public health
services.294 This included expenditures such as the direct
delivery of public health care through government public
289. Health, United States, 2010, supra note 251, at 38788 tbl.125.
290. Id. at 36970 tbl.125.
291. Id. at 32 & fig.23, 37172 tbl.126.
292. Id. at 37172 tbl.126.
293. See, e.g., GETZEN, supra note 223, at 335 (describing the primary sources
of government funds in 1997).
294. See Health, United States, 2010, supra note 251, at 36970 tbl.125 & n.2
(referring to public health services as “[g]overnment public health activities” in
table 125).
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health agencies.295 A recent GAO report on graduate medical
education explained further that “[t]he federal government
invests significantly in medical education through various
programs to help ensure that the anticipated supply of new
physicians meets the nation’s health care needs.”296 These
payments totaled $8.76 billion in 2008 and included direct
and indirect financing for graduate medical payments at
teaching institutions, as well as loan programs and
scholarships guaranteed or administered through the
federal government.297 The federal government operates as
an agent of its citizens by financing medical education,
which creates physician capacity for health care delivery.
Moreover, as ACA implementation proceeds, the
government will significantly increase its role, acting as
agent in the delivery of health care by financing research
and development of new health technologies, the problems
of health care disparities, and biomedical approaches to
diseases and illness.298 For example, the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, a division of the federal
Department of Health and Human Services, expended
nearly twothirds of its 2000 annual budget ($203.8 million)
to finance grants and contracts for medical researchers
throughout the nation.299
In all these capacities, the government uses its
constitutionallydelegated authority to regulate interstate
commerce, and relies on its taxing and spending powers to
effectuate health care policy and reform. As such, the
agency relationship between the government and its people
may exhibit the same divergences of interests, monitoring,
and transaction costs that characterize any other agency
relationship. Theoretically, a government may fail to
295. Id.
296. Letter from Kathleen M. King & George A. Scott, GAO Graduate Med.
Educ. (GAO09438R), to The Hon. George Miller et al., House of
Representatives 16 (May 4, 2009) (available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09438r.pdf).
297. Id. at 12.
298. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320e (West Supp. 2010) (establishing the Patient
Centered Outcome Research Institute); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 9511 (West Supp.
2010) (establishing a PatientCentered Outcome Research Trust Fund).
299. JOHN M. EISENBERG, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY,
QUALITY RESEARCH FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/
about/qr4qhc/qr4qhc1.htm#director.
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maximize public welfare or become captured by special
interest bureaucrats or political groups, thus corrupting the
execution of its fiduciary responsibilities. In practice,
whether distributing reimbursement funds, establishing
vaccination programs, processing medical school loan
applications, or overseeing biomedical research grants,
government officials may fail to act loyally in accordance
with public preferences and mandates and may fail to
exercise duties of care, competence, and diligence as
required by their fiduciary roles. Agency law may provide
recourse for these public conflicts of interest, and
governments may enforce agency law in order to realign
the interests of its own agents or agencies with the interests
of public citizens. An example of how this law may be
applied to require a government to serve the public’s
interest may be found in a recent Fourth Circuit case
involving the government of Rwanda.300
In Republic of Rwanda v. Uwimana, the Rwandan
government commenced an adversary proceeding in
bankruptcy court to recover public funds that a former
ambassador spent to procure asylum for himself and his
family soon after the outbreak of civil war in his home
country.301 Holding that the ambassador had improperly
used his country’s public funds, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed with the district court’s finding that
“ambassadors are, by definition, fiduciaries for the country
they represent [which had] . . . entrusted him with state
secrets and financial assets, and undoubtedly expected his
undivided loyalty and faithful service.”302 Further, the court
of appeals found that the discretion afforded to the
ambassador “arose within the context of a principalagent
relationship” which required him to act to further the
300. See Republic of Rwanda v. Uwimana (In re Uwimana), 274 F.3d 806 (4th
Cir. 2001), which held that:
An agent must avoid conflicts of interests with his or her principal and
“[i]f the agent is to receive any benefit from a transaction in which he is
serving his principal, the agent must fully disclose any interest he has in
the transaction and receive the consent of his principal to proceed, even if
the principal ultimately was to benefit from the transaction.”
Id. at 812 (quoting Gussin v. Shockey, 725 F. Supp. 271, 275 (D. Md. 1989)).
301. Id. at 80809.
302. Id. at 811.
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interest of the state.303 Finally, applying agency law, the
court concluded that “under basic principles of agency law,
Aloys Uwimana plainly breached his duty to Rwanda.”304
The Uwimana case teaches three lessons. First, the
fiduciary principles of agency law can be used to redirect
public spending away from selfinterested objectives and
toward state objectives. Second, in the same way that a
Rwandan official was held responsible to his nation, officials
of the United States government may be made subject to
the rules of agency law as fiduciaries in the delivering and
financing of medical care, medical education, medical
research, and public health care generally in order to
discharge the fiduciary obligations of the state. Government
officials, as agents of the American population, owe a
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the public generally, and to the
patient population specifically.
However, it is the third lesson from the Uwimana case
that may be the most profound. To apply the agency model
to a state, acting through its government officials without
full consideration of the ethical dimensions of the
relationship between that government and its people, is to
completely misuse and misapply agency law. It risks
destruction of both the descriptive and prescriptive
usefulness of the fiduciary medicine model. The government
of Rwanda, plaintiff in the Uwimana case, won its claim in
court without reference to any political, humanitarian,
social, and moral considerations related to the work of that
government in 1994 that made it prudent, and even urgent,
for the defendant ambassador to seek asylum in the United
States.305 The Uwimana court’s application of agency law in
this case appears to have been blind to the possibility that
the ambassador’s cause was just, and to the likelihood that
the Rwandan government was not only furthering injustice
but was also conducting a brutal genocide of nearly
303. Id. at 812.
304. Id.
305. For one hundred days beginning in early April 1994, and continuing
through July 1994, the Hutu government of Rwanda conducted a brutal and
systematic mass killing of the country’s Tutsi population and their Hutu
sympathizers, assassinating between 500,000 and 1,000,000 people in a
genocide that wiped out nearly threequarters of the Tutsi population in
Rwanda. See ALISON DESFORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN
RWANDA 6, 1718 (1999).
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1,000,000 people at the time. Such a phlegmatic application
of agency law cannot be optimal.
Professor J. Gregory Dees has argued that principal
agency models are descriptively and prescriptively deficient
because they “blind . . . [analysts and policymakers] to
important
ethical
dimensions
of
contractual
arrangements.”306 Professor Dees identified four major
biases that result from an unqualified reliance on the
heuristic device of employing the principalagency model to
solve legal and policy problems, such as the organization of
health care relationships in the United States. The
problems are that the resulting laws and policy may: “1)
[i]gnore the principal’s obligations to the agent, 2) [d]evelop
excessive distrust and disrespect for agents [in the relevant
relationships and proposed solutions], 3) [o]verlook ethical
constraints, such as fairness, [that should control the
principals and agents] and 4) [m]iss solution possibilities
that include ethical norms.”307 The Uwimana case is an
example of an accurate application of agency law, without
consideration of the ethical context or norms that might
have given rise to a solution that was faithful to the legal
principles of agency law, but also sufficiently cognizant of
the ethical imperatives that underlie it. A more nuanced
306. J. Gregory Dees, Principals, Agents, and Ethics, in ETHICS AND AGENCY
THEORY 25, 31 (Norman E. Bowie & R. Edward Freeman eds., 1992).
307. Id. at 35. I focus here on the second and third biases that Professor Dees
identifies. However, the implications of Professor Dees’ first and second biases
also have significant importance to the fiduciary medicine model. They deserve
further attention than can be provided here. In fact, the principalagency
relationship in health care should not be understood as a series of oneway
obligations flowing only from providers and financiers to the patient population.
The responsibilities of the principal owed to the agents in this model are
significant. The agency model can accommodate these as well. The Restatement
(Third) of Agency § 8.15 (2006) describes the principal’s duty to deal fairly and
in good faith with the agent and to provide information to the agent about risks
of harm or financial loss. These duties obligate patients to exercise personal
responsibility for their own health care, to conserve financial resources in
consuming health care, and provide the legal limitations on agents’ liability for
harms unknown to them. The Restatement explains that the “agencylaw duties
of principals to their agents are less numerous than the duties of agents to
principals . . . because an agent’s position always enables the agent to take
action with consequences for the principal’s legal relations . . .” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.13 intro. note (2006). However, Dees’ caution that the
law must not excessively distrust and burden agents alone is indeed applicable
to the fiduciary medicine model as well.
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application of the law may have avoided a decision that lent
the imprimatur of American judicial support to a regime
engaged in a horrific genocide. So as not to repeat the error
of the Uwimana court’s use of the agency model, the final
section of this paper is dedicated to addressing the ethical
issues inherent in applying the fiduciary medicine model to
organize and understand the agency relationships that
make up the American health care delivery system. This
section has presented the fourth and final principle of the
fiduciary medicine model: the state owes a fiduciary duty of
good faith, loyalty, and care as an agent in public and
private health care markets.
D. Limits and Objections
In summary, the fiduciary medicine model is based on
these four fundamental principles: first, agency is the
primary fiduciary relationship that characterizes the
treatment relationship between medical providers and their
patients, thus agency law is the body of rules that should
govern these relationships. Second, while the law of agency
governs most medical treatment relationships, the law of
trusts governs those health care relationships that dispose
of property, such as the role of health plan administrators
who collect premiums and pay claims. Third, fiduciary law
provides the substantive and procedural legal rules needed
to align the diverse interests of patients who enroll,
subscribe, or are beneficiaries under contracts with
integrated health care organizations. Fourth, when the
state and federal governments manage health care markets
as payers, regulators, educators, and researchers, the state
owes fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and due care to
its citizens. Regulation based upon these seemingly
straightforward four principles will hold providers and
payers accountable to the underlying intent and objectives
they
have
already
articulated
for
themselves.308
Nevertheless, the fiduciary medicine model represents a sea
change in the way and extent to which American health law
fits with the structure and substance of American health
care delivery. As with any sea change, there may be
turbulence.

308. See infra Section I.A.1.
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“Fiduciary duties are the highest standard of conduct
imposed by law.”309 While it is appropriate to impose the
highest standard on the high calling of healing and saving
lives, the decision to elevate the legal responsibilities of
health care providers to explicitly require the highest legal
obligations will not be welcome at first. Providers may fear
expanded legal scrutiny of their affairs, and view the
fiduciary standard as an intrusion on their medical
autonomy. Jurists may also object to the burden this model
imposes on them. While fiduciary rules are clear, they are
not simple. Applying fiduciary standards is a complex and
factspecific endeavor that may meet resistance that is not
uncommon to a call to replace a familiar, albeit ill fitting
and ineffective, legal paradigm.310 And notwithstanding its
strengths, the fiduciary model also presents doctrinal
challenges in its own right. For example, damages in tort or
contract available under current law more completely
compensate victims than fiduciary damages may in the
private medical context. Also, the efficacy of awarding
fiduciary damages without proof of injury will require a
paradigm shift that may appear threatening at first.
However, the flexibility of applying equitable remedies in
place of damages may prove an attractive alternative in the
long run. Despite these objections and limitations, the
fiduciary medicine model offers a final advantage over
current alternatives that must be discarded: the fiduciary
medicine model is not only a legally and politically optimal
approach, it is also optimal from a social perspective.
This is because the fiduciary medicine model presented
here addresses what Professor Dees calls the “Level 3
questions.” These “Level 3” questions ask what fiduciary
arrangements “would be best . . . from a social perspective.
Desirable . . . [fiduciary agreements] should respect rights,
promote social welfare, and support (or, at least, not
undermine) our shared values about the kind of society we

309. Nicolas P. Terry, Physicians and Patients Who “Friend” and “Tweet”:
Constructing a Legal Framework for Social Networking in a Highly Regulated
Domain, 43 IND. L. REV. 285, 304 (2010)).
310. See, e.g., Gary A. Varnavides, The Flawed State of BrokerDealer
Regulation and the Case for an Authentic Federal Fiduciary Standard, 16 J.
CORP. AND FIN. L. 203, 211 (2011).
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want to maintain.”311 To be useful at all, the fiduciary
medicine model must operate to lead to socially preferred
arrangements. The next section of the Article turns to the
final step of showing how the theoretical fiduciary medicine
model constructed thus far can work to improve the social
and practical organization of health care delivery in the
United States.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE FIDUCIARY MEDICINE MODEL
Having defined the substantive content of the fiduciary
medicine model, as well as demonstrated the need for and
efficacy of this analytical paradigm, I now turn to showing
how the model can work. This section sets out two
approaches that legislatures and courts can use to
implement the fiduciary medicine model. Most directly,
state legislatures can enact an enabling statute to guide
stakeholders in discharging and courts in construing the
fiduciary responsibilities actors will have under the ACA.
This section suggests a model for such legislation.
Alternatively, this section also introduces a way in which
courts may use the fiduciary medicine model on a caseby
case basis as challenges to the statute arise.
A. A Proposed Standard for Judicial Review
Courts will be called upon to answer new questions
about the reformed health care landscape, and they will be
asked to resolve familiar disputes in light of the new
legislative enactments. This section shows how the fiduciary
medicine model provides a paradigm to guide courts in
reaching consistent and predictable rules for regulating
health care relationships. The first example demonstrates
how the model applies to greatly improve and clarify the
conflicts of interest that pervade health care interactions,
311. Dees, supra note 305, at 33. In Dees’ analysis, Level 1 questions ask what
agreements would best serve the individual interests of the principal and agent
parties to a fiduciary relationship. Id. at 31. Level 2 questions ask what joint
solutions the parties to a fiduciary relationship would bargain to reach between
or among them. Id. Level 3 questions go to the moral gap that usually occurs,
according to Dees, as a result of applying the principalagent model as a
heuristic, as I have done here, without refining the model to correct for the
ethical biases inherent in it. Id. This discussion addresses the moral gap that
Dees has identified.
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which increasingly will be characterized by organizational
structures that depend upon financial integration of several
stakeholders in the health care market. The second example
applies the fiduciary medicine model to show how the courts
can construe existing and postreform law of informed
consent to improve both the theory and practice of shared
medical decision making.
1. Financial Conflicts of Interest. In the past, courts have
declined to enforce fiduciary principles to regulate the
impact of financial incentives on physicians “even though
courts recognize the obvious force that fiduciary principles
have in doctorpatient relationships and that these
principles are generally hostile to financial conflicts of
interest.”312 This hostility runs counter to the ACA. Many of
the structures created by the reform statute rely directly
upon legislativelysanctioned methods of offering financial
incentives to providers. These entities can only succeed if
existing law changes to protect their intended functions. For
example, under Title III, Part III of the ACA which
Congress titled “Encouraging Development of New Patient
Care Models,” Section 3022 charges the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services to establish a
“Shared Savings Program” to reward groups of providers
and suppliers who coordinate care through a new entity
called an “Accountable Care Organization.”313 Each ACO
will be made up of group practices, networks of individual
practices, partnerships or joint ventures between hospitals
and professionals, or hospitals and professionals who are
“willing to become accountable for the quality, cost, and
overall care of the Medicare feeforservice beneficiaries
assigned to it.”314 ACOs will be financially rewarded for their
efficiency gains because they will receive additional
payments beyond the existing fees when they lower costs.315
The Secretary will choose the payment model to apply to
ACOs, and much will depend on the form that these new
entities take.316 However, whether through a partial
312. Hall, supra note 102, at 504.
313. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395jjj(a) (West Supp. 2010); see also supra note 113
and accompanying text.
314. Id. § 1395jjj(b)(1)(2).
315. Id. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(B).
316. Id. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(B)(ii).
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capitation model,317 a feeforservice model returning
savings based on benchmark expenditure levels set by the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services,318 or other
payment models,319 ACOs will receive annual incentive
bonuses in exchange for achieving savings per Medicare
beneficiary. The congressional objective for the Shared
Savings Program is to extend ACOs beyond the Medicare
patient population. The ideal is to penetrate private
insurance markets with the ACO model that incorporates
evidencebased medical practice with sharing financial risk
throughout the market.320
Financial risksharing will also be central to another
organizational form that the ACA calls “patientcentered
medical home[s].”321 These medical homes represent an
integrated model for the delivery of coordinated medical
care that the ACA incentivizes to improve the quality and
control the cost of health care delivery. The ACA approves a
National Pilot Program to implement payment bundling.
Bundling will allow services from different physicians to be
grouped together for billing purposes, in order to increase
integration and “improve the coordination, quality, and

317. Id. § 1395jjj(i)(2).
318. Id. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(B).
319. Id. § 1395jjj(i)(3).
320. See MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPROVING INCENTIVES IN THE
MEDICARE PROGRAM 3942 (June 2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/
documents/jun09_entirereport.pdf; KELLY DEVERS & ROBERT BERENSON, URBAN
INST., CAN ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IMPROVE THE VALUE OF HEALTH
CARE BY SOLVING THE COST AND QUALITY QUANDARIES? 7 (2009), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411975_acountable_care_ orgs.pdf; Steven
M. Shortell & Lawrence P. Casalino, Health Care Reform Requires Accountable
Care Systems, 300 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 95, 97 (2008).
321. 42 U.S.C.A. § 256a1(c)(2) (West Supp. 2010). Title III, Section 3502 of the
ACA defines patientcentered medical homes as:
a mode of care that includes—(A) personal physicians or other primary
care providers; (B) whole person orientation; (C) coordinated and
integrated care; (D) safe and highquality care through evidence
informed medicine, appropriate use of health information technology,
and continuous quality improvements; (E) expanded access to care; and
(F) payment that recognizes added value from additional components of
patientcentered care.
Id.
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efficiency of health care services.”322 Another example is in
Section 3027, which extends and finances gainsharing
demonstration projects that began in New York and West
Virginia.323 Under gainsharing arrangements, physicians
and hospitals share financial risk in the hope of sharing in
the financial benefits of integrated medical practice.324 All of
these newlyenacted programs create opportunities for
providers to combine and share the financial risk of
delivering health care goods and services. Financial risk
sharing is not new; however, to the extent that courts have
in the past found the law hostile to such “conflicts of
interest,” the law must be corrected.325
In fact, agency law under the fiduciary medicine model
is not uniformly hostile to financial conflicts of interest.
Admittedly, there is no agency statute or case directly on
point that magically solves the potential for selfdealing and
conflicts of interest that arise when financial rewards
incentivize highquality patient care. However, the
principles of the fiduciary medicine model would direct
courts to apply Section 8.06(2) of the Restatement (Third) of
the Law of Agency, and the cases construing those
provisions, to find specific guidance “from an integrated
body of concrete rules” that evince a reasoned approach to
governing ACOs, medical homes, and other new forms of
integrated delivery organizations.326
The Restatement (Third) of Agency Law provides that a
principal may consent to allow an agent to act for more than
one principal in a transaction among the three parties.327
This provision expressly accommodates agents who may act
on behalf of multiple principals in transactions, such as one
where a physician acts as the agent for both the patient
principal that she treats and for the payerprincipal who
pays her bill. The Restatement offers considerable guidance
concerning the fiduciary obligations that a physician bears
in such a case of dualagency—a case that presents itself
ubiquitously throughout the health care delivery system in
322. Id. § 1395cc4(a)(1).
323. See id. § 1395ww.
324. See id.
325. See Hall, supra note 102, at 504.
326. Id. at 490; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(2) (2006).
327. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(2) cmt. d (2006).
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America.328 First, the physicianagent must disclose to each
principal not only the fact that she acts for the other
principal, but also “all other facts that the agent knows, has
reason to know, or should know would reasonably affect the
principal’s judgment.”329 Beyond disclosure, agency rules
admonish the physicianagent to deal fairly and in good
faith with each principal.330 These, of course, are broad
exhortations that have to be fleshed out in actual cases
involving litigated disputes in order to have meaning or
provide any guidance. Indeed, courts have been able to find
such guidance in some analogous contexts that are
instructive.
In National Plan Administrators, Inc. v. National
Health Insurance Co.,331 a health insurance underwriter
sued a thirdparty administrator and its parent company,
alleging that the defendants’ transfer of the plaintiff’s
cancer health insurance policies to a competing insurer
breached their fiduciary duty as agents for the plaintiff.332
The parties had entered a contractual agreement that
provided that the plaintiff would underwrite insurance
products developed and marketed by the defendants, but
that the defendants’ services were not exclusive to the
plaintiff.333 In other words, the original defendant, National
Plan Administrators (“NPA”), was an agent of the original
plaintiff and principal, National Health Insurance
(“National Health”), but NPA also served as the agent for
328. Id. § 8.06.
329. Id. § 8.06(2)(b)(i)(ii).
330. Id. § 8.06(2)(a).
331. 235 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. 2007).
332. Id. at 697. The lower appellate court agreed with the plaintiff’s claims,
holding that the defendant administrator owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff
insurer, and that the defendant’s burden to show its fiduciary obligation to show
fairness in the transaction with the subsequent purchaser—a second principal—
had not been discharged. See Nat’l Plan Adm’rs, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Ins. Co.,
150 S.W.3d 718, 73032 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 235 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. 2007).
Although the Texas Supreme Court overruled that decision, finding that the
Texas Insurance Code did not place a fiduciary burden on the defendant third
party administrator, the lower court’s description of the duties that an agent
owes in representing multiple principals, as well as the cases cited are helpful
for future cases in which a fiduciary obligation does exist. Nat’l Plan Adm’rs,
235 S.W.3d at 70004.
333. Nat’l Plan Adm’rs, 150 S.W.3d at 724.
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other insurers, including one of its direct competitors. Thus
NPA served several other principals in addition to National
Health.
During the course of the relationship, the principal,
National Health, gave notice to its agent that it had ninety
days to find a buyer for its book of business because
National Health would no longer underwrite cancer
policies.334 The agent approached another of its principals to
purchase National Health’s policies, and in so doing
allegedly disclosed confidential information to a
competitor.335 The principal, National Health, ultimately
lost a considerable amount of business to the competitor
who purchased only the most profitable policies, and left
behind the highest risk policies which were not
marketable.336 National Health sued its agents, NPA and
the parent company, as well as the competing principal,
alleging fraud, breach of contract, and breach of general
fiduciary obligations.337 Although the jury and the
intermediate court of appeals both found that the defendant
agents did breach their fiduciary duty to National Health,
awarding compensatory and punitive damages to the
principal,338 the Texas Supreme Court reversed this
decision, holding that the defendant thirdparty
administrator and its parent company did not breach any
general fiduciary duty owed to National Health.339 In its
analysis, the Texas Supreme Court reviewed the agency
rules that apply to enforce fiduciary obligations that arise
by virtue of legislation, the common law, and contractual
agreement between parties.340 This analysis offers several
insights that could guide courts and lawmakers facing
questions involving the impact of financial incentives on
334. Id. at 727.
335. Id. at 72728.
336. Id. at 728.
337. Id. at 729.
338. Id.
339. Nat’l Plan Adm’rs, 235 S.W.3d at 701, 704. In the main, this holding was
based on the court’s finding that the Texas Insurance Code did not place a
fiduciary duty on thirdparty administrators. However, in its analysis of other
fiduciary duties the defendant owed to its principal insurer, the court provided
helpful insight concerning the law pertaining to dual agencies. See id.
340. See id.
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medical judgment when physicians occupy the role of agent
to multiple principals, including a payer.341
First, the Texas Supreme Court demonstrated that an
agency relationship imposes a very specific and “certain” set
of fiduciary duties on the parties.342 Approving the
Restatement of Agency,343 the court next confirmed that
these specific duties may be altered by the parties’
contractual agreement.344 Thus, the National Health court
concluded that fiduciary duties between agent and principal
owed under statute or law may be altered by the parties’
agreement.345 The role that contractual agreements have in
shaping fiduciary responsibilities between parties is one of
the most important doctrinal distinctions between trust and
agency law where medical relationships are concerned.
The Texas high court considered the scope of NPA’s
fiduciary duties imposed under the state’s Insurance
Code.346 While that statute indeed provided that anyone who
solicited insurance on behalf of an insurance company shall
be held to be the agent of the company, the court read other
provisions in the statute that addressed thirdparty
administrators’ fiduciary obligations specifically to
supersede the general agency provision.347 “Even if we
assume the Code provisions pertaining to agents generally
also apply to thirdparty administrators, the Legislature
341. Note that not all relationships between a physician and a payer are
agency relationships. For example, a physician may have no contractual
connection to a patient’s insurer whatsoever, and thus may not be held to
represent that payer in an agency relationship. On the other hand, payers who
selectively contract with physicians and through a master or operating
agreement impose financial and other incentives to contain costs are acting as
principals exercising some degree over physicians as their agents.
342. Nat’l Plan Adm’rs, 235 S.W.3d at 700.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 702 (“‘This section makes the basic point that an agent’s duties of
performance to the principal are subject to the terms of any contract between
them.’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.07 cmt. a (2006)).
“Accordingly, factors which must be taken into consideration when determining
the scope of an agent’s fiduciary duty to his or her principal include not only the
nature and purpose of the relationship, but also agreements between the agent
and principal.” Id. at 700.
345. Id. at 70002.
346. See id. at 70001.
347. Id.
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clearly and specifically addressed certain fiduciary duties in
the Code, yet it did not impose a general fiduciary duty on
agents in general or on thirdparty administrators.”348 This
holding teaches that legislatures may, and indeed must,
carefully define the fiduciary duties that will apply to
govern an agency relationship in order to avoid confusion
and give effect to their intent. Where lawmakers have been
unclear about defining these obligations, judicial decisions
may not line up with legislative intent.
Lastly, the National Health court declared, “fiduciary
duties are equitable in nature and generally not subject to
hard and fast rules.”349 These lessons should embolden
private parties as well as policymakers who have been timid
about addressing the impact that financial incentives in
managed care contracts may have on physicians’ medical
obligations to patients. The rules of agency offer guidance
and flexibility for the law to develop practical and
enforceable rules that can accommodate the need to ensure
physician loyalty to patients in their treatment
relationships, and also allow them to honor their
contractual and perhaps legislative commitments to contain
costs while providing high quality care.
This case provides an example of how the fiduciary
medicine model can provide a guiding body of common law
cases to aid courts. The postreform health care markets
will contain an increasingly important collection of
financially integrated entities that will rely upon financial
incentives to improve health care quality and efficiency. The
National Health approach is useful to balance fiduciary
rules that seek to protect physicians’ independent medical
judgments from the taint of financial incentives.350
The fiduciary medicine model can address a wide range
of thorny fiduciary issues in other aspects of the dual
agency issue that are pervasive in the health care context.351
348. Id. at 701.
349. Id. at 702.
350. See Hall, supra note 102, at 504.
351. See, e.g., Arthur D. Little Int’l, Inc. v. Dooyang Corp., 928 F. Supp. 1189,
1208 (D. Mass. 1996) (discussing how disclosure to the principal of a conflict of
interest in accordance with duty did not absolve the firm of “all other fiduciary
duties as an agency”); Kirkruff v. Wisegarver, 697 N.E.2d 406, 411 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (discussing the burden to show full disclosure of all relevant information
to the principal before entering a transaction and the duty to still render
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It can also address other fiduciary matters, such as the
prohibition against physicians gaining material benefit from
transactions on behalf of their principals,352 fraud and abuse
prohibitions against kickbacks and selfreferrals, and
incidents of the medical relationship itself. The fiduciary
medicine model may offer guidance to courts and legislators
in nonfinancial matters involving physicians and patients
as well. Moreover, the model can do more than rigid legal
rules can to incentivize advanced interactions between
related parties. The next section applies the fiduciary
medicine model to a fiduciary relationship that traditional
legal rules have been ineffective in monitoring. The
objective of informed consent law is to promote shared
medical decision making between patient and physician.353
Negligence principles have been summarily ineffective in
this regard.354 The fiduciary medicine model introduces
flexibility and protections that are much more likely to not
only regulate but also cultivate the care environment and
relationships policymakers seek.
2. Informed Consent. The example of informed consent
is instructive because it represents a discrete issue between
patients and physicians—the most basic fiduciary unit—
that had not been resolved before health reform, despite the
clear understanding that this relationship is fiduciary in
character. Therefore, applying the corrective refinements in
the fiduciary model would improve informed consent law
even without the improvements enacted under the ACA.
However, the fact that the ACA goes further to adopt a new
“patient decision aid” approach to informed consent also
serves to demonstrate the fiduciary objectives that Congress
sought to serve by enacting this part of the reform.355
“competent and independent advice to the principal”); Lane v. Oustalet, 873 So.
2d 92, 99 (Miss. 2004) (holding that a dual agent has “separate burdens” to each
principal); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 3.14, 3.15 (2006)
(regarding the hierarchy of duties to multiple agents and subagents).
352. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (2006).
353. Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed
Consent: The Case for Shared Medical DecisionMaking, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429
(2006).
354. See Alan Meisel, From Tragedy to Catastrophe: Lawyers and the
Bureaucratization of Informed Consent, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 479,
48082 (2006).
355. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 299b33 to 34 (West Supp. 2010).
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a. Clarifying Existing Law. Elsewhere I have
argued that if courts applied fiduciary rather than
negligence rules to informed consent cases, this change
would help to revive the legal doctrine’s usefulness to all
patients while also improving its application to religious,
racial, and ethnic minority patients.356 My article was a
contribution to a sizeable literature addressing the gap
between the legal duties imposed under the informed
consent law that courts and theorists articulate, and what
doctors actually do357 when they talk with their patients to
obtain their consent to treat.358 Still, in informed consent
cases, courts regularly assert that the physicianpatient
relationship is one of “trust and confidence,” giving rise to
the physician’s fiduciary obligation to provide information to
the patient.359 Yet, case law does not flesh out the content of
the physician’s fiduciary duty or provide guidance to courts
that want to apply fiduciary law to resolve informed consent
disputes. The fiduciary medicine model would give content
to the informed consent doctrine, both procedurally and
doctrinally.
The fiduciary medicine model would impose an agent’s
duty on physicians to share decisionmaking authority with
356. See Matthew, supra note 125.
357. See id.; see also Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 411, 41725 (2006) (reviewing empirical literature that shows that
physicians do not effectively inform and patients do not adequately understand
what is going on in the informed consent conversation).
358. Peter Schuck first noted the “informed consent gap” in 1994. See Peter H.
Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 90304 (1994). Many
have suggested expansion of the scope of the physician’s duty to fill this gap.
See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV.
511 (1997); Frances H. Miller, Health Care Information Technology and
Informed Consent: Computers and the DoctorPatient Relationship, 31 IND. L.
REV. 1019 (1998). Some urged that a greater focus on patient autonomy would
fix the problem. See, e.g., Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy:
Protecting Patients from Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291 (1994). But
when jurists did train a focused eye on patient autonomy, others called “the
suffocating hegemony of the autonomy principle” a failing policy. See Schneider,
supra note 357, at 413.
359. See, e.g., Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Tracy
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 1991); Hunter v. Brown,
484 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
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their patients, rather than merely satisfy the disclosure
requirements negligence law requires. The duty to act in the
best interest of a patient would counsel that providers
consider the individual patient’s needs and preferences with
respect to the extent of information, communication style,
who shares in medical decision making, and the level of
deference the patient wishes to give to the provider. Agency
law would also require providers to offer patients
information that is responsive to the varying degrees of
autonomy or collaboration a patient prefers, the
circumstances of the illness, as well as the cultural and
religious values that the patient and family hold. The
physician’s duty of loyalty under agency law would
influence the communication style chosen for each patient.
Courts reviewing informed consent challenges would
examine the procedure and context of information that the
patient received in order to make an informed medical
choice, to determine whether the provider honored the duty
to act in good faith.360
The fiduciary model expands the scope of a provider’s
obligation to inform a patient of her medical options and
obtain her consent to treat. This model asks a physician to
communicate information in a way that takes account of the
patient holistically and seeks to provide information that
will be useful to a patient’s decision. The physician’s
obligation under the fiduciary model of informed consent is
not overly burdensome. In the same way that courts now
apply agency law to hold realtors or travel agents
responsible for investigating the circumstances of market or
360. State legislatures could also revise existing informed consent statutes to
reflect agency rather than negligence law principles. As an illustration, take for
example the Florida statute entitled the “Florida Medical Consent Law.” FLA.
STAT. § 766.103 (2005 & Supp. 2011) (codifying the common law informed
consent doctrine). Should the Florida legislature wish to replace the negligence
principles underlying this law, lawmakers could revise the language in
paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) to prohibit action for failure to obtain informed
consent against the providers protected under the statute who had acted in the
best interest of their patients, fulfilled their duties to act loyally for the patient’s
benefit, and subordinated their own interests and the interests of third parties
to the interest of the patient. Further, the statute might obligate providers to
honor their duty of confidentiality in all communication, and to act with care,
competence, and diligence. The difference would be that these provisions would
not refer to the reasonableness standard of care defined by the medical
community, but would instead depend upon standards of agency law that have
construed these terms in other agency contexts.
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political conditions that are particularly relevant to their
clients,361 agency law principles provide a basis for
expanding and contextualizing the informed consent
conversation between providers and patients. In these
cases, patients would have the procedural benefits of an
agency action where the burden of proof is on the fiduciary
to show that no breach occurred once the obligation to
protect patient interests is shown. The injury in these cases
would be the provider’s failure to engage patients in shared
decision making, rather than the mechanical and now
meaningless negligence obligation to deliver cursory
information about risks, benefits, and alternatives to
proposed care. Agency law would also provide a more
structured protection for providers who exercise due care to
discharge their duties of loyalty and good faith to patients,
similar to the way in which the business judgment rule
protects corporate directors and managers who employ
reasonable and prudent decision making to avoiding loss or
harm.362 Agency principles impose reciprocal obligations
upon principals that would require patients to provide
information that providers need in order to make the
informed consent conversation a meaningful one.363
b. Reforming Consent Law. The ACA reforms the
law of informed consent by carving out a category of
patients who are facing the option to elect “preference
sensitive care,” and introducing a “program to facilitate
shared decisionmaking” to regulate informed consent in
those cases.364 The ACA’s regulatory approach to consent
calls for an independent entity to develop standards for
educational tools called “patient decision aids.”365 The ACA
requires that these tools be evidencebased, disclosing
361. See, e.g., Rookard v. Mexicoach, 680 F.2d 1257, 1261–63 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a travel agent who is not “a mere ticketagent” has a duty to a
customer to “warn of those dangers of which he is aware, or should be aware”
because of the dependent relationship).
362. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007).
363. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.15 (2006) (“A principal [must]
provide the agent with information about risks of physical harm or pecuniary
loss that the principal knows, has reason to know, or should know are present in
the agent’s work but unknown to the agent.”).
364. 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b36 (West Supp. 2010).
365. Id. § 299b36(b)(1).
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traditional information—risks, benefits, and options—but
doing so in a way that is appropriate to the age, culture,
educational background, and health literacy of the
patient.366 The ACA instructs the Health and Human
Services Secretary to award grants to establish resource
centers that would provide technical assistance in
developing and disseminating information about best
practices to implement the shared decision making
program.367
The ACA’s stated purpose in this section is to “facilitate
collaborative processes between patients, caregivers or
authorized representatives, and clinicians that engages the
patient, caregiver or authorized representative in decision
making, provides patients, caregivers or authorized
representatives with information about tradeoffs among
treatment options, and facilitates the incorporation of
patient preferences and values into the medical plan.”368
This purpose is clearly grounded in the expectation that
providers will be guided by patients in the way that a
principal guides an agent. Also, the ACA broadens the scope
of considerations a physician must include to determine
what additional decision makers must be included, what
preferences and values must be a part of the doctor’s
consent conversations, and the particular patient’s decision
making style369 in much the same way that a fiduciary agent
serving a patient’s best interest would. But despite the
fiduciary characteristics of this rule, the ACA’s regulatory
approach to shared decision making is only a partial
improvement upon the negligence rules that currently
prevail.
The regulatory rules apply only to “preference sensitive
care,” and although this term is defined in the ACA,370
courts will be left to choose what cases fall within the ACA’s
regulations and which cases fall without. The ACA appears
to preserve the existing negligence standard for those cases
that are not preference sensitive, resulting in a mix of rules
366. Id. §§ 299b36(c)(d).
367. Id. § 299b36(e).
368. Id. § 299b36(a).
369. Id. §§ 299b36(c)(d).
370. See id. § 299b36(b)(2).

800

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

and outcomes that will be difficult for patients and
providers to use as a guide to ordering their future conduct.
The terms of the new standards for patient aids will have
the advantage of being developed and tested by medical
experts, but they will not be easily linked with legal
standards that could inform enforcement uniformly and
predictably. As with any standard that must await caseby
case challenges to give substance and boundaries to its
terms, the future effectiveness of the shared decision
making provision of the ACA is uncertain. Should courts
construe the statute to reflect a fiduciary standard, and
should courts adopt the fiduciary model’s agency standard
to inform their review of the case, then the law will offer
clear guidance upon which many can rely to improve doctor
patient communication. But if courts make inconsistent
judgments about the statute’s language, the law will have
suboptimal impact on the way physicians and their
patients relate. The problem is that no standard of
construction or review is expressly included in the ACA. The
repair for this defect is simple; the plain language of the
statute could state the drafters’ intent to impose a fiduciary
standard of behavior on the actors subject to the terms of
the law. The next section offers model language that could
be used by states to codify the fiduciary medicine model.
B. A Proposed Legislative Enactment
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (“UPIA”) is found in
Restatement (Third) of Trusts371 and was drafted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (“Commission”).372 The rule was approved at the
Commission’s 1994 Annual Conference373 and offers states a
model statute to define the standard of care owed by
trustees who manage trust assets.374 Immediately this
uniform statute is distinguishable from the health care
agency relationships under consideration here in that it
defines trustee obligations, and not obligations owed by an
371. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007).
372. John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of
Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 641 & n.3 (1996).
373. See id. at 641.
374. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007).
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agent to a principal.375 However, because of the many
similarities in the legal duties owed by both trustees and
agents, the UPIA provides an instructive example of how
the law may operationalize the fiduciary medicine model.
Recall that in the hypothetical example of Mercy
Medical Hospital,376 the hospital stands in an agency
relationship as the principal with varying degrees of control
over its agents. The hospital may have substantial control
over some directlyhired employees such as nurses,
laboratory technicians, and orderlies. But it will have less
control over other agents such as independentlycontracted
radiologists and hospitalists who are hired by the
institution, and far less control over physician groups with
admitting privileges such as physicians who operate in its
surgical suites. On the other hand, Mercy Medical is an
agent representing the oftencompeting interests of
patients, payers, health plans, and its organizing entities,
which could be a board of trustees, a charity, a foundation,
or even a group of shareholders. The range of relationships
regulated by the UPIA may also be applied to bring legal
order to the agency relationships involving Mercy Medical.
Hypothetically, a “Prudent Provider Rule” might read as
follows:
§1. Prudent Provider Rule
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a
health care provider who delivers medical goods or services
owes a duty to patients to comply with the prudent provider
rule set forth in this Act.
(b) The prudent provider rule, a default rule, may be
expanded, restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered by the
provisions of a providerpatient relationship. A provider is
not liable to a patient to the extent that the provider acted
in reasonable reliance on the mutually agreedupon
provisions of the relationship.
§ 2. Standard of Care
(a) A provider shall deliver those medical goods and
services that are in the best interest of the patient who has
375. See id.
376. See supra Part II.B.1.
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entrusted himself or herself to the provider, as a prudent
provider would, by considering the medical condition,
patient history, physical, social, and cultural background,
and other information reasonably relied upon by other
prudent providers, the purposes, terms, requirements of the
patient’s entrustment, and other circumstances of the
relationship. In satisfying this standard, the provider shall
exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.
(b) In addition, the provider must
(1) conform to fundamental fiduciary duties of
loyalty and impartiality;
(2) act with prudence in deciding whether and how
to delegate authority and in selecting and
supervising agents; and
(3) incur only costs that are reasonable in amount
and appropriate to the responsibilities of the
overall duties of patient care.
(c) A provider’s treatment and management decisions
respecting individual patients must be evaluated not in
isolation, but in the context of the patient’s medical
condition as a whole and as a part of an overall treatment
strategy, having risk and benefit objectives reasonably
suited to the circumstances of the individual patient.
(d) Among circumstances that a provider shall consider
in treating and managing a patient are such of the following
as are relevant to the patient:
(1) general scientific, medical, and economic
conditions given the setting in which medical
goods and services are being provided;
(2) the possible effect of future uncertainty in either
the patient’s condition or in other factors that
may impact it;
(3) the expected health consequences of treatment
decisions or strategies;
(4) the role that each treatment decision or course of
action plays within the overall health of the
patient, which may include family history or
past medical history;
(5) the expected prognosis for timing and extent of
recovery;
(6) other resources, interests, or concerns of the
patient including social, familial, cultural,
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religious, and philosophical concerns expressed
by the patient;
(7) needs for mobility, regularity of activity, and
preservation or appreciation of physical capacity;
and
(8) without any regard to the special relationship or
special value, if any, to the purposes of the
relationship to one or more of the beneficiaries.
(e) A provider shall make a reasonable effort to verify
facts relevant to the care, treatment, and management of
patient entrusted to him/her.
(f) A provider may provide any kind of medical care
goods and services of a type of medical care consistent with
the standards of this Act.
(g) A provider who has special skills or expertise, or is
named provider in reliance upon the provider’s
representation that the provider has special skills or
expertise, has a duty to use those special skills or expertise.
These statutory terms would provide guidance for the
primary relationships between Mercy Medical and its
patients, and all caregivers working directly within its
auspices and control as they interact with patients as well.
To the extent that Mercy Medical extends admitting
privileges or offers its physical plant for use by other health
care professionals, a Prudent Provider Act might further
provide as follows:
§ 3. Delegation of Provider Functions
A provider may delegate patient care and treatment
functions that a reasonable provider of comparable skills
could properly delegate under the circumstances, using
reasonable care, skill, and caution in:
(a) selecting an agent;
(b) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation,
consistent with the terms of the patient care relationship;
and
(c) periodically reviewing the agent’s actions in order to
monitor the agent’s performance and compliance with the
terms of the delegation.
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In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a
duty to the provider and to patients to exercise reasonable
care to comply with the terms of the delegation.
The scope of these obligations can be expanded far
beyond simple negligence rules to include the duties of
loyalty, prohibitions against selfinterested behavior, and
the duty of good faith. Finally, the Prudent Provider Act
would distinctively control the administrative relationships
in which Mercy Medical operates as an agent for payers
such as a managed care organization, health plans,
employers, or its organizing authority. In those cases, the
act may specify fiduciary obligations as follows:
§4. Administrative Provisions of the Provider
Relationship
In the delivery of medical goods and services, the
provider
(a) has a duty to conform to any applicable statutory
and contractual provisions governing the financing of
patient care;
(b) has a duty to conform to any applicable statutory
provisions governing the organization of the provider and
its related entities; and
(c) has the powers expressly or impliedly granted by the
terms of its organizing entity or entities and the
organizations providing for the financial reimbursement of
medical goods and services it provides.
Of course, all the shortcomings of a uniform act must be
acknowledged in this hypothetical exercise, as well as the
advantages the statute could bring. The standards of
conduct defined in a Prudent Provider statute will not
immediately resolve all agency conflicts that arise in health
care relationships; the law will have to evolve over time as
courts interpret the rules and lawmakers amend the
statute.377 The Prudent Provider provisions will have to be
adapted to extend to insurers, plan administrators, and
377. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §
612 (2009).
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other actors in the health care industry. All common law
constructions will not be uniform, and some unintended
consequences may result and require revision of the
statute.378
Yet, the hypothetical Prudent Provider statute’s
helpfulness cannot be denied for three important reasons.
First, it demonstrates that a state legislature, wishing to
adopt a set of default fiduciary rules from agency law to
govern and guide providers, patients, and thirdparty
payers, could easily draft an enabling statute much along
the lines of the UPIA. Second, as the UPIA places emphasis
on an overall investment portfolio strategy for trustees, a
similar statute might synthesize and bring the orderly legal
regime of agency law to oversee the complex networks of
obligations owed by health care providers to patients and
those with whom they interact to access health care goods
and services. Third, the broad acceptance of the UPIA—
adopted in fortythree jurisdictions as of 2006379—offers a
paradigm for creating the type of overhaul in the standard
of care applicable to health care relationships. This shift
would involve a transition from a predominately negligence
based regime, to a regime adopting the fiduciary medicine
model advanced here. Most importantly, promulgating a
statute to enact the fiduciary medicine model would
establish legal guidelines that are flexible yet predictable in
a way that will better serve the interests of patients who
depend upon providers, and providers who desire to
responsibly manage the loyalties they owe to their patients,
payers, and the health care delivery system overall.
CONCLUSION
Prior to passage of the ACA, the disorder and
misunderstanding that characterized fiduciary law in
American health care jurisprudence left few casualties. The
resulting body of conflicting health law cases was little help
378. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 372, at 669 (describing the overall impact
of the new uniform act in positive terms and declaring it a “giant first step”).
Langbein described some of the act’s likely consequences as “unsettling”. Id. at
643.
379. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 373, §§ 616666; see also MARILYN E. PHELAN,
NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS, AND ASSOCIATIONS § 4.15 n.1
(2000 & Supp. 2009).
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to the industry in ordering its affairs, and policymakers lost
use of a legal paradigm that could have brought clarity to
the health care industry. However, now that health reform
promises to reconfigure the entire organizational landscape
in which health care is delivered, financed, researched,
studied, measured, and evaluated, the disorder and
confusion are no longer tenable. American health reformers
may have shunned the public option, a singlepayer, and
any true form of socialized medicine. But even the market
based reform that has emerged recasts our federal and
state governments into the central role as manager of
competitive private insurance markets, subsidizer of public
Medicaid and Medicare markets, and overseer of a national
strategy to improve health care quality. Moreover, the ACA
introduces a rash of new organizations and entities that
have never before existed and have no precedent to guide
their operation or interaction. Thus, the need for an orderly,
welldeveloped body of law to implement and sustain the
new entities and roles created by health reform could not be
more urgently needed. Indeed, the viability of health reform
may depend upon it.
This Article has constructed a fiduciary medicine model,
capable of turning a wellintentioned but unguided series of
fiduciary rules into a longstanding, judicially enforceable,
predictable set of obligations to guide a network of health
care providers, payers, and even governments in their work
to provide universal health care. By bringing clarity to the
legal rules that apply to health care delivery, the fiduciary
medicine model makes three essential contributions. First,
it gives depth and substance to the legal rules shaping the
relationships that already exist in the health care delivery
network. The fiduciary medicine model is both faithful and
responsive
to
the
fundamental
physicianpatient
relationship that has been recognized from antiquity, but
for which the laws of negligence and contract alone provide
an insufficient regulatory base. Second, it enlarges the
existing understanding of responsibilities and obligations
that apply not only within the physicianpatient
relationship, but throughout the network of agency
relationships among all providers, consumers, financiers,
administrators, and organizers of health care delivery.
Finally, the model provides a legal framework to organize
and enforce the new relationships that will arise as the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is implemented.
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The fiduciary law and other laws that regulated our
prior health care landscape were as varied as the actors and
organizations that comprised the industry itself. However,
the reform that Congress has enacted seeks to construct and
manage a system of markets that deliver coordinated and
cost effective care. The fiduciary medicine model is a well
suited complement, able to deliver the coordinated,
thorough, and efficient legal paradigm needed to regulate
and preserve the new American health care system.

